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 1 
1  Introduction 
1.1  The issue 
Water is a basic human right as it is fundamental to life and death. It is a key asset for 
socio-economic growth and development at all levels, ranging from the national level to the 
individual. Access to water and sanitation1 is a key factor in improving health, economic 
productivity and social well being of the human populace as both social and economic 
activities rely heavily on the quantity and quality of water. Access to water is therefore an 
essential component of any effort to alleviate poverty. In fact, all the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are directly or indirectly related to (access to) water. For 
example, Goal 7, target 10 – to halve the proportion of world population without sus-
tainable access to safe drinking water2 between 1990 and 2015 – is a key target in its own 
right but achieving that target is critical to the attainment of other goals (UNDP 2006). 
 
Yet, in achieving this target, “sub-Saharan Africa remains the area of greatest concern. It 
is a region of the world where, over the period 1990-2004, the number of people without 
access to drinking water increased by 23%” (WHO/UNICEF 2006: 3). Moreover, the 
region experienced an 85% increase of its urban population between 1990 and 2004, but 
the number of urban dwellers unserved with safe drinking water doubled during the same 
period (ibid). According to the Human Development Report 2006, some 1.1 billion 
people in the developing world do not have access to a minimal amount of clean water. 
While the minimum threshold is about 20 litres a day, these 1.1 billion people use about 5 
litres a day (UNDP 2006). 
 
A major cause of poor access to water services in sub-Saharan Africa is the inefficiencies 
of water utilities, especially those that serve the urban areas. Many systems are charac-
terised by high water losses, insufficient revenues to cover operating costs, dilapidated 
and poor functioning infrastructure, lack of investments, low billing and collection effi-
ciency, chronic water shortages and failure to meet the existing demand, low coverage, 
especially for the urban poor, and corruption, among others (see e.g. World Bank 2004). 
In addition, the quality of water services is often low. For instance, it is estimated that 
over one-third of the urban water supplies in Africa operate intermittently and with 
quality concerns (WHO/UNICEF 2000). 
 
Like other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya’s socio-economic development goals 
are highly dependent on the availability of water in good quantity and quality. The 
government’s long-term objective is to ensure that all Kenyans have access to clean 
                                                 
1 As much as this paper concerns water, sanitation cannot be completely detached from water issues. 
2 Safe drinking water is defined as “water that is safe to drink and available in sufficient quantities for 
hygienic purposes” (WHO/UNICEF 2006: 22). 
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potable water, and that water is available for key economic activities such as agriculture, 
fisheries, livestock production (and therefore food security), manufacturing, hydropower 
generation, and tourism (MWI 2005; Kenya 2006b). 
 
The water sector reforms currently being implemented in Kenya under the Water Act 
2002 of the Laws of Kenya are designed to contribute to the realization of this long-term 
objective as well as to addressing the policy, regulation and service provision weaknesses 
in the previous set-up under Water Act Cap 372. Furthermore, reforms in the water sector 
are also considered an essential pillar in the government’s poverty reduction strategies, 
the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (Kenya 2003), 
and the ambitious Vision 2030. In other words, the government recognises that for the 
country to achieve the MDGs there is need to make water available, accessible and af-
fordable, especially to the poor. This, directly or indirectly, calls for increased coverage; 
reduction of the high water losses; rehabilitation and expansion of existing schemes; 
sustainable demand management; construction of new water supply schemes; trans-
parency, accountability and good water governance; efficiency; clear institutional frame-
work; and encouraging pro-poor focus, strategies and programmes, among others. 
 
Based on a preliminary tour of five towns in Kenya, this Working Paper discusses the 
water sector reforms and interventions in Kenya and their emerging impact and chal-
lenges. This is a first step towards a broader research agenda on the “Impact of water 
reforms and interventions on the livelihood of the urban poor in Kenya”. The Working 
Paper is divided into six sections. Section 1 lays the foundation which includes an over-
view of the private sector involvement in the urban water sector as well as the link 
between the urban poor, access to water and their livelihood. Based on available literature 
so far, Section 2 presents the water supply situation in Kenya while Sections 3 and 4 
presents an overview of the water sector reforms in Kenya and water interventions in 
urban Kenya, respectively. Section 5 gives a report of the preliminary tour of the five 
towns, followed by (in Section 6) an analysis of the emerging impact and challenges of 
water sector reforms and interventions in urban Kenya. 
1.2  Private sector involvement in the urban water sector 
Already in the 1980s, as part of the structural adjustment ideology advanced by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), privatisation was seen by these institutions as 
the best way to get the water sector in developing countries on its feet again.3 The most 
radical form is full privatisation (divestiture), i.e. a private company becomes the owner of 
the infrastructure and takes full responsibility for operation, maintenance and investment. 
The government’s role is reduced to one of regulation. This model is uncommon and has 
only been adopted in England and Wales (Budds & McGranahan 2003). Nowadays, full 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Prasad (2006) and Wambua (2004) for an overview of “debates” on privatization, generally and 
in Kenya, respectively. 
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privatisation as a way to reform the water sector is seen by many as undesirable and 
unnecessary (Hukka & Katko 2003). 
 
Much more common are various forms of public-private partnerships. Usually, a distinction 
is made between ‘service contract’, ‘management contract’, ‘lease contract’, ‘concession 
contract’ and the so-called ‘BOT-type contract’4 (Budds & McGranahan 2003; World 
Bank 2004; K’Akumu 2006; Kirkpatrick et al. 2006). Responsibility for service provision is 
shared between the public and the private sector, with differing levels of responsibility being 
delegated to the private partner depending on the contract type (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Allocation of key responsibilities for private participation options 
 
Service 
contract 
Management 
contract 
Lease Concession BOT-type Divesture 
Asset 
ownership 
public public public public 
public/ 
private 
private 
Capital 
investment 
public public public private private private 
Commercial 
risk 
public public shared private private private 
Operations/ 
maintenance 
public/ 
private 
private private private private private 
Contract 
duration 
1-2 years 3-5 years 8-15 years 25-30 years 20-30 years indefinite 
Source: Budds & McGranahan (2003: 89). 
 
 
Two other options of private sector participation include joint ventures and cooperatives 
(Budds & McGranahan 2003). A joint venture is an arrangement whereby a private 
company forms a company with the public sector. The co-operative model is a type of 
government-owned public limited company, subject to the rules and regulations of other 
public limited companies and of which the majority of shares are publicly owned (either by 
the government or citizens/users). This model combines public ownership with business 
principles. Such arrangements are in place in countries including the Netherlands, Germany, 
Poland, Chile, Bolivia and the Philippines (Budds & McGranahan 2003; Meijer 2005). 
 
By the beginning of the 21st century, 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa5 had adopted some 
form of private sector involvement, while some others were proposing it (Bayliss 2003). 
                                                 
4 Build-Own-Transfer contract. 
5 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, South Africa and Uganda (Budds & 
McGranahan 2003: 106). 
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Contracts are dominated by French multinational corporations, especially Saur.6 In some 
cases, company and government were unable to reach an agreement, which has to do with 
the dilapidated state of the water utilities and the inability of many (poor) customers to pay 
the commercial prices; examples being Nairobi7 and Gweru (Zimbabwe). According to 
Budds & McGranahan (2003: 106), “sub-Saharan African countries have in general been 
unable to attract companies that are willing to invest in the region, as it is regarded as too 
risky”. This is reflected by the fact that (a) most contracts are short-term, non-investment 
management and lease contracts; (b) contracts are being drawn up in US dollars to protect 
companies from local currency devaluation; and (c) water utilities are commonly bundled 
with electricity in order to create more attractive commercial opportunities (ibid). 
 
Two alternative types of private sector participation in the water sector concern water kiosks 
and private water vendors. Water kiosks are a form of public-private partnership whereby 
the government provides water to the kiosk where it is re-sold to the local customers. The 
‘private’ component can be a private company but also a group of citizens united in a 
community-based organisation (CBO) and either or not supported by one or more non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). 
 
Private water vendors – also known as the “other” private sector (Solo 1999) – are 
“informal” and/or small-scale operators who provide water (and sanitation) services in 
mostly low- and middle-income neighbourhoods. They operate apart from the government 
and may even be illegal. They have a generally negative image, usually cast as “the ‘bad 
guys’ who charge usurious rates” (ibid: 119). However, there are many other types of small-
scale entrepreneurs in the water and sanitation sector than the young men transporting two 
or more 20-litre jerry-cans of water on their bicycles and selling it at (very) high prices 
during the dry season. Based on a literature review, Solo (1999: 121-122) lists the following 
examples: 
• Individual families with water and/or sanitation connections who provide services to 
their neighbours (e.g. 25% of the Bamako water supply). 
• Water points and/or latrines managed or owned by individuals or community groups 
(30% of the Addis Ababa water supply) or NGOs. 
• Bulk water supply systems like tank trucks which distribute to cisterns or to individual 
families (various Latin American examples). 
• Privately owned and managed public toilets and bath houses (e.g. in India, Bangladesh, 
Peru and China). 
• Private competitive water networks which provide house connections to water and sani-
tation (e.g. in Paraguay and Indonesia). 
                                                 
6 The international private water sector is dominated by five large multinational corporations. Three of 
these are from France (Suez, Veolia and Saur), one from Germany (Thames Water) and one from Spain 
(Aguas de Barcelona). See e.g. Budds & McGranahan (2003: 105) and Bayliss (2003). 
7 In 2002, the French company Générale des Eaux proposed to take charge of Nairobi’s chaotic water 
billing system, but the offer was rejected because there was little interest in rehabilitating the dilapidated 
infrastructure through which the city council continued to incur massive losses (Wambua 2004: 7). 
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• Closed water systems with treatment plants and piping networks owned by residents 
(e.g. in Argentina). 
• Truckers with private wells (e.g. in Bangladesh, Kazakhstan and other former GOS 
republics). 
• Sewage removal services, septic tank emptiers and night soil carriers (e.g. in Abidjan 
and Dar es Salaam and most other sub-Sahara African cities). 
• Private waste water treatment plants (e.g. SIBEAU in Cotonou8). 
 
Despite enormous variations in terms of prices and quality of services offered, the overall 
conclusion of the review was that these small-scale water supply and sanitation enterprises 
were generally highly successful, witness for instance these common characteristics: “they 
recover their costs fully and are financially sustainable; they have virtually no unaccounted-
for-water; they require no public subsidy, borrowing or debt” (Solo 1999: 122). Key factors 
appeared to be, amongst others: the legal recognition of the small-scale water sector by the 
local authorities; a sound competitive system; some form of regulation by the government; 
and the creation of customer loyalty (implying that businesses should not become too large). 
 
In terms of reaching the poorer segments of the urban populations, Solo (ibid: 130) 
concludes that “the best way to help the poor doesn’t seem to be to expand the water 
company’s coverage (…) but, rather, to encourage more small-time entrepreneurs to enter 
the market and to compete”. This is to some extent confirmed by several statements from 
the side of the large private water companies, such as by Biwater’s General Manager, 
referring to Zimbabwe, who claimed that “from a social point of view these kinds of 
projects [public sector subsidies for the poor] are viable but, unfortunately, from a private 
sector point of view they are not.”9 
 
Despite Solo’s plea for small-scale water enterprises in an open, legal, competitive market to 
serve the low-income groups, it remains to be seen how viable it can be in the short-term in 
a country like Kenya. This can be illustrated by an example from one of the large slums in 
Nairobi – Mathare.10 Most people in Mathare rely for their water on private vendors who are 
a menace in two ways: for the public water company because they illegally tap the water 
from the main water supply and for the consumers because by forming water cartels they 
charge high prices. These water cartels also exist in the neighbouring largest slum in Nairobi 
– Kibera. The reaction has been that the public company and local residents have come 
together to form community water groups or associations to manage the resource. More and 
more NGOs and CBOs are working in the sector, the result being that meanwhile four such 
                                                 
8 SIBEAU is one of the very few waste water treatment plants in the whole of Africa. Despite the positive 
remarks by Solo (1999: 124, Box 2), the system is not without its problems (see Brock & Foeken 2006: 
563-564). 
9 Zimbabwe Independent, 10 December 1999, quoted in Budds & McGranahan 2003, p. 109. 
10 “Kenya: The fight for water – a valuable slum commodity” (http://www.irinnews.org, accessed on 15 
August 2007). 
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associations have been launched in Kibera, eight in Korogocho and eight in Mukuru (two 
other large slum areas in Nairobi). 
 
However, Kjellén & McGranahan (2006: 19) argue that: 
“In theory, there is nothing particularly contradictory about the fact that vendors provide an 
important service, and most vendor users are not getting sufficient water. Nor is there anything 
particularly contradictory about a water strategy that aims to get vendors to provide improved 
water (and sanitation) services to the urban poor in the short run, and to drive vendors out of 
business by way of providing better utility services in the long run.” 
1.3  The urban poor, access to water and livelihoods 
Millennium Development Goal 1 calls for a reduction of 50% between 1990 and 2015 in 
the number of people who suffer from hunger and whose income is less than US$1 a day. 
However, during the 1990s, the percentage of people in sub-Saharan Africa living below 
the poverty line of US$1 a day rose, as did the number of undernourished people.11 
Instead of declining, poverty is actually on the rise in this part of the world and by 2015 
about half of its population will be living in urban centres. Poverty will have increasingly 
moved from rural to urban areas. According to Satterthwaite (1997: 5), urban poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa was “steadily and frighteningly on the increase during the 1980s and 
1990s”. Even though, in absolute terms, the rural poor still outnumber the urban poor, the 
latter group has been increasing at an alarming rate over the past few decades, a 
phenomenon commonly described as the ‘urbanization of poverty’ (Ravallion 2001). 
 
Furthermore, urban areas were particularly hard hit by declining economies and the 
resulting structural adjustment policies, the cost of which were disproportionately felt by 
the urban poor (Rakodi 2002b). Life in urban areas has become more expensive, while 
employment in the formal sector has decreased and real wages have not kept up with 
price increases or have even declined in absolute terms (see e.g. UNCHS/HABITAT 
1996; Simon 1997). In other words, many urban households have been faced with a 
serious decline in purchasing power. People have responded to this in a number of ways, 
with the diversification of income sources undoubtedly being the most notable (Bigsten 
& Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1992; Ellis 2000; de Haan & Zoomers 2003; Kaag et al. 2004). A 
wide range of activities are being employed, all in the informal sector (see e.g. Lee Smith 
& Memon 1994; Rogerson 1997; Hansen & Vaa 2004). 
 
Kenya is a good example of this scenario. It is a rapidly urbanizing country. By 2000, one 
third of the total population of 30 million was classified as urban. In 2015, the urban 
population is expected to have almost doubled (to 17 million), comprising 45% of the total 
population (UN-HABITAT 2005). This means that between 2000 and 2015, the total 
Kenyan population will have grown by 25%, but the urban population by 68%. The rapid 
                                                 
11 See http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/gdmis.do  
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growth of the urban population is partly caused by the influx of people from the rural areas 
looking for work in town. These people mostly end up in one of the many slums or informal 
settlements. 
 
Their perspectives to find a job in the formal sector are bleak: since 1990, employment 
growth in the formal sector has been virtually zero, so it is the informal sector that absorbs 
most new job seekers (Kenya 2003), i.e. if they manage to find (or create) work at all. No 
wonder then that poverty – and urban poverty in particular – has been increasing. Between 
1992 and 1997, the percentage of Kenya’s population living in absolute poverty rose from 
42% to 53%, while urban poverty increased from 29% to 49% (Odhiambo & Manda 2003). 
In order to survive, people engage in all kinds of income-generating activities, such as some 
kind of small business, petty trade, farming (both in town and in the ‘rural home’), merry-
go-round groups, etc. (see e.g. Owuor & Foeken 2006). However, livelihood is not only 
about (access to) income-generating activities but is also about access to all kinds of 
provisions and services that determine the quality of life, water included.12 
 
Rapid urbanization and unplanned growth have placed enormous pressure on the capacity 
of towns to provide adequate basic services for their growing populations. Local autho-
rities, overwhelmed by the rapid and unplanned development of towns, lack the capacity 
or resources to address the widening demand-supply gap (UN-HABITAT 2008). It is a 
well-known fact that most slums – i.e. those parts of cities and towns where the urban poor 
live – lack such basic facilities as roads, water supply, sanitation, solid and liquid waste 
disposal, electricity, schools and hospitals, among others. Yet access to such facilities has a 
direct impact on people’s well-being (health, nutritional condition, education, etc.) and an 
indirect impact on their income generation. For instance, a person with good education and 
in good health is likely to perform better than a person lacking these qualities. Also, the 
production capacity of a small business can improve considerably when electricity and or 
water are available throughout the year. 
 
Among the challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa, provision of safe water supply and 
adequate sanitation are of the highest priority. Even where there is water, the quality is 
often poor, leading to exposure to waterborne diseases. The Human Development Report 
2006 stresses that the crisis in water and sanitation is above all a crisis for the poor. It 
further states that almost two in three people lacking access to clean water survive on less 
than US$2 a day, with one in three living on less than US$1 a day (UNDP 2006). More-
over, “the poorest people not only get access to less water, and to less clean water, but 
they also pay some of the world’s highest prices” (ibid: 7). The latter applies particularly 
to the urban poor, mainly because they are often forced to buy water from private water 
vendors (see e.g. Kjellén & McGranahan 2006). 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed description of the concept of livelihood, see e.g. Kaag et al. (2004) and de Haan & 
Zoomers (2003). On urban livelihoods in developing countries, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, see 
e.g. Rakodi & Lloyd (2002). 
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According to UN-HABITAT (2007), the urban poor get their water by queuing for hours 
to collect water from standpipes or illegal connections. Others buy their water from 
vendors who can charge up to twenty times more for water than the price paid by their 
wealthier neighbours. As such, not only do the poor suffer financially; they also suffer 
poor health from using unsafe water and poor sanitation facilities. It is estimated that “at 
any one time, close to half the population in Africa, Asia and Latin America suffer from 
one or more of the main diseases associated with inadequate water and sanitation” (ibid: 
6). A survey conducted in Nairobi’s informal settlements revealed that the prevalence of 
diarrhoea among children is 32%, while the infant and child mortality is 35%. The 
prevalence of diarrhoea was found to be double the rate for Nairobi and the national 
average (APHRC 2002). 
 
As indicated earlier, water is a key asset for socio-economic growth and development at all 
levels, ranging from the national level to the individual. In Kenya, a stage has reached 
where availability of water is the limiting factor for any development activities (Kenya 
2006b). Improved access to safe and affordable water, especially to the urban poor, is 
likely to have an impact on their livelihood, directly or indirectly, in at least three ways 
(UN-HABITAT 2006: 28-29): 
• It has a positive impact on health (and, as a consequence, nutrition), which increases 
time and energy to invest in productive activities. 
• Closer proximity of water sources and increased quantity available reduces the time 
necessary to fetch water. 
• Improvements are especially relevant for women, who are traditionally responsible for 
looking after ill relatives, and for fetching water for the whole household. 
 
In other words, improved access to safe and affordable water at the household and 
individual level is likely: 
• To reduce the time spent on fetching or queuing for water, waterborne diseases13, 
child morbidity, expenditure on water, and water related conflicts. 
• To increase the girl-child’s school attendance. This is because girls are sometimes 
forced to be late or miss school to help their mothers fetch water. 
• To improve household’s health conditions. 
 
In terms of economic production at the level of the business and/or household, at least two 
more benefits can be mentioned: 
• Depending on the nature and size of the business, micro and small enterprises may 
benefit. This was for instance shown by a comparative study in two small towns in 
Uganda (Davis et al. 2001). 
                                                 
13 The most common waterborne diseases in Kenya include malaria, typhoid, cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery, 
bilharzias and worms (Kenya 2006b). 
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• Urban farming, which is a very common and important livelihood activity for many of 
the urban poor, becomes much less dependent on the often unreliable rain. A study in 
Nakuru town (Kenya) showed that mean crop harvests from urban plots were sub-
stantially higher when irrigation was practiced (Foeken 2006: 60). 
 
Moreover, the time, energy and resources spent on some of the activities linked to poor 
access to water can be used on such and other productive economic activities, especially 
for the girl-child and women who bear the primary responsibility for water at the 
household level (UN-HABITAT 2008). Women devote a good deal of their time and 
their physical effort to supplying the family with water, and express a genuine demand 
for improvements in the water supply and sanitation of their home. 
 
However, women and the poor, including other vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, are 
often excluded from decision-making yet they are the most affected by lack of water and 
sanitation services (UN-HABITAT 2008). Poor urban dwellers, like everyone else, are 
entitled to reliable, affordable, well managed and sustainable water supply and related 
services (UN-HABITAT 2007). On a more positive note, UN-HABITAT’s 2006 Global 
Report on Water and Sanitation in the World’s Cities – Local Action for Global Goals, 
notes that “inadequate water supply is not mainly due to a lack of government funds. 
Indeed, in many cities and smaller urban centres, it is possible to improve provision of 
water in low-income settlements while charging their inhabitants less than they currently 
pay for inadequate provision” (ibid: 6). 
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2  Urban water supply in Kenya 
 
Generally, provision of water has remained one of challenges for the government for a 
long time. With the increasing growth in population and the subsequent socio-economic 
pursuits, including urbanization, industrial production, tourism and agricultural activities, 
demand for water has increased rapidly. If not checked, the demand for water may soon 
surpass the supply not only due to the growing needs of the increasing population, but 
also limited natural endowment of fresh water as well as serious degradation of water 
resources (Kenya 2006b). Kenya, which is considered as a water scarce country with only 
647 m3 of renewable fresh water per capita14, therefore, faces serious challenges with 
regard to water services (MWI 2005; Krhoda 2008). 
 
The situation is not any better in the urban areas: meeting the rapidly growing urban 
demand for safe and affordable water is already a daunting challenge for many local 
authorities. Not only are the numbers of people who need better water supplies very 
large, water itself is becoming scarcer (UN-HABITAT 2007). Dilapidated infrastructure, 
low levels of revenue collection, poor management, and lack of accountability in govern-
ance are further obstacles to the sustainable improvement of access to water in the urban 
areas, and particularly in low-income settlements (UN-HABITAT 2008). 
 
Furthermore, Kenya is one of the few countries in the world where urban drinking water 
coverage from improved sources has actually declined during the 1990-2004 period (WHO/-
UNICEF 2006: 15). The urban water supply situation in Kenya can be summarised as 
follows (UN-HABITAT 2005: 5): 
 
“Water supply in Kenyan cities is highly inequitable. Over 50% of the urban poor, living in 
slums, have no access to safe drinking water and end up paying vastly more for municipal piped 
water. Local governments provide water in towns, but their water supply capacity is insufficient 
to cover the urban needs. Some water providers have recently been privatised to increase resource 
mobilisation and investments.” 
 
The Water Services Regulatory Board provides a gloomier picture (WASREB 2008: 1): 
 
“According to Kenya’s National Water Services Strategy for 2007-2015, only 60 per cent of 
households in urban areas have access to safe water. In the low-income settlements where a 
majority of the urban poor live, only 20 per cent of the population have access to safe water, 
exposing them to relatively high tariffs charged by water vendors. These settlements are also 
bedevilled by poor hygienic conditions owing to low coverage and the dilapidated state of 
                                                 
14 This is below the recommended minimum of 1000 m3 per person per year (Krhoda 2008). 
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sanitation facilities. The poor state of sanitation poses risk of pollution to water sources from 
which most of the informal settlements draw water.” 
 
This gloomy picture is confirmed by some recent articles in national newspapers15 picturing 
Nairobi slum inhabitants who face increasing problems in getting clean water in terms of 
both time (long queues for water points) and money (costs have gone up). As one resident 
explained, “water is the most sought-after item in Dagoretti16 owing to lack of piped water. 
Residents have to buy it from private water vendors who have turned the problem to their 
advantage”17 (see also Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Disparity in water access in urban areas 
The poor are paying much higher for water than the rich. Slum dwellers in Nairobi do not have 
water connections from the municipality. They depend on private water vendors for their day-to-
day water needs. This is also true to so many other urban dwellers in all parts of Kenya. With no 
regulated prices for water, the poor are being charged as much as ten times more for water, whose 
quality is not assured, compared to what the residents with piped water are paying. 
Source: Kenya (2006b: 127). 
 
How ‘inequitable’ the provision of safe water in urban Kenya is, is not very clear. 
According to the same article in The Standard, “out of three million Nairobi residents, only 
200,000 have access to adequate clean water”. That would be in line with Alder’s (1995) 
finding that 12% of the Nairobi slum households have water directly available on plot, while 
86% obtain water from kiosks. However, a study carried out in 2000 (Gulyani et al. 2005) in 
Nairobi, Mombasa and Kakamega revealed that 71% of the sampled households in Nairobi 
had access to piped water (either a private in-house piped connection or a yard tap).18 In 
Mombasa and Kakamega, these percentages were 50% and 56%, respectively. The 
remaining households had to rely on water kiosks (19%), ground and natural sources (10%, 
but almost only in Kakamega) and water vendors (5%), while a few households had their 
‘own source’ (a well or borehole) or relied on neighbours. The major findings of the study 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Although half of the sampled households are connected to the public utility, they have to 
supplement irregular water supply with purchases from small-scale private service 
providers such as kiosks, tankers, vendors. 
• Only 5% of those connected to the public utility are poor, hence poor people have no 
option but to rely on small-scale private providers. 
                                                 
15 See for instance The Daily Nation of 21 February 2006 and The Standard of 19 June 2006. 
16 Dagoretti is a peri-urban slum area in Nairobi. 
17 The Standard, 19 June 2006. 
18 The difference between these two observations may be due to way of sampling in the study by Gulyani et 
al. (2005). In Nairobi, eight sites were selected, but it is not clear how many of these concerned slum areas. 
Based on their Table 4 (p. 9), it seems that slightly over 40% of the Nairobi study population could be 
classified as ‘poor’. This would suggest that the poor are under-represented in the Nairobi sample, because 
it is generally assumed that at least 60% of the Nairobi population is living in slums. 
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• Given their (forced) reliance on private providers, both poor and non-poor households 
pay very high prices – the median price is US$ 2.1 per cubic meter. 
• All households consume little water – median water use is 30 litres per capita per day 
(lcd) and the average is 40 lcd. 
• Kiosks receive water from the public utility at a subsidised price of US$ 0.15 per 
cubic meter but charge their customers, on average, 18 times that price. This subsidy 
mechanism has therefore not had the desired result of reducing prices for [low-
income] customers. 
• Overall, neither public utilities nor private providers deliver a desirable water service 
and the majority of households rate ‘improvement in water supply’ as their top 
development priority. 
 
In short, the study by Gulyani et al. (2005) shows that “the current water supply situation [in 
the three urban centres] is dismal” (ibid: 27). As far as the urban poor are concerned, the 
study’s findings are in line with other literature, which shows that “the urban poor are not 
likely to have a private water connection, are likely to be paying high unit prices for water 
that they purchase, and are spending a significant amount of time in collecting water” (ibid). 
 
A “citizens’ report card” on urban water, sanitation and solid waste services undertaken 
in Kenya’s three largest cities – Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu – five years later (in 
2006) showed similar results. A comparison of the ‘poor’ and the ‘non-poor’ revealed 
that there are distinct inequities in access to ‘mains connections’ between the poor and 
non-poor, with the poor reporting lower access. The difference is particularly dramatic in 
Kisumu, where only 7% of the poor reported having access to mains connections 
compared to 81% of the non-poor. As such, poor households are much more likely to be 
using water kiosks as their primary source of water than the non-poor and therefore 
paying higher prices for lower levels of service. Furthermore, many households are 
experiencing periods of water scarcity, and the poor are more likely to face scarcity than 
the non-poor. During such periods, consumers are forced to rely on unsafe and expensive 
sources of water (Citizen’s Report Card 2007). 
 
The situation presented above is typical of other towns. Until 1985, Nakuru was adequately 
served with water. In recent years, however, the supply of water has been characterized by 
chronic shortages, high unaccounted-for-water19 and poor demand management. The level 
of unaccounted-for-water is estimated at 19,000 m3 per day and this is mainly attributed to 
illegal water consumption and connections, the high number of non-metered connections, 
shortage of meters, defective meters, leakage of long service lines, and wastage at the 
council housing estates (communal water closets) (Mwangi 2000; Onjala 2002; Meijer 
2005). 
 
                                                 
19 Unaccounted-for-water is the difference between the quantity of water supplied to the network and the 
metered quantity of water used by the customers. 
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Based on fieldwork carried out in 1999-2000, Onjala (2002) compared five Kenyan urban 
centres – Nairobi, Eldoret, Kisumu, Nakuru and Thika – regarding the performance of their 
water authorities, measured in terms of service ratio, unaccounted-for-water, metering, and 
collection efficiency. The service ratio is the percentage of the urban population served by 
the public water utility and ranged from 52% (Kisumu) to 88% (Nairobi20). The percentages 
of unaccounted-for water were high: 45% (Nakuru) to 82% (Kisumu) of the water produced 
was ‘lost’ due to the dilapidated state of the pipeline infrastructure and/or illegal 
connections. As for water metering, only an estimated 25% of the consumers in Nairobi 
were properly metered. In the other four urban centres, percentages of metered connections 
were much higher (76-90%). However, the example of Kisumu shows that such figures can 
be very misleading, because only 32% of all the meters in this town were thought to be 
working. Moreover, the working meters were not read at a regular basis (despite a meter-
reading workforce of no less than 61). Finally, the collection efficiency (percentage of 
consumers being billed) was low, ranging from 39% (Nairobi, Kisumu) to 76% (Thika). 
Given that many consumers are not metered, this implies that only a small percentage of the 
water supplied to consumers is actually paid for. Onjala (2002) also provides these 
performance indicators for a group of 89 urban centres in Kenya,21 i.e. including many 
smaller urban centres. The average service ratio for these 89 towns was 39%, the percentage 
of unaccounted-for-water stood at 74%, the metering at 28% and the collection efficiency at 
41%. Compared with the figures of the five larger towns, this suggests that in smaller urban 
centres the water situation is even worse (see also UN-HABITAT 2006). 
 
What are the implications of such malfunctioning public urban water systems for the people 
who live there, and for the poor in particular? Meijer (2005) carried out a survey among 
households in Nakuru town. Water for individual households came from three sources: the 
public utility (Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services Company - NAWASSCO) with its 
piped system, private water vendors and water kiosks. Piped water was provided to many 
neighbourhoods, but the supply was quite unreliable due to rationing and low pressure in 
the pipes. Only in the high-income areas and in the municipal council estates, 
NAWASSCO water was available throughout. The price the consumers were charged 
was very low and far below ‘recovery costs’; in other words, NAWASSCO water was 
highly subsidised. 
 
Although the piped water system also reached several low-income areas, many (if not 
most) poor households could not afford the costs for a connection and/or the landlord was 
not willing to pay. As a result, many middle- and low-income households had to rely on 
alternative sources, mainly private water vendors and water kiosks. Water vending by 
private individuals was quite common in Nakuru, even though it was an illegal activity. 
However, many poor households could not afford the high prices charged by the private 
                                                 
20 As indicated above, this seems to be an unrealistically high percentage. 
21 As obtained from the Water Development Department of the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources. 
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water vendors, which was 10 to 20 times higher (depending on the season) than the tariffs 
of the NAWASSCO. The recently constructed water kiosks (five, of which three were 
operational when the study was carried out, and charging a price that was seven times 
higher than the public utility) were a solution for the poor households. 
 
However, these kiosks received their water from the public system, so the water quality 
was below standard and they were also subject to rationing (water being available two or 
three times per week only). Rainwater harvesting was another, fairly common alternative, 
but only during the rainy season. Especially during the dry season, the (very) poor faced 
serious problems. They had either to economize on their water consumption or look for 
alternatives such as “getting water from friends or neighbours, fetching water from 
leakages or illegal connections from the reticular system, or walk for miles searching for 
water from (dirty) streams” (Meijer 2005: 61). 
 
A study in Eldoret revealed that most of the sources of domestic water in Langas – an 
informal settlement – are contaminated with faecal matter and do not meet the WHO 
guidelines for drinking water quality. This is largely because most people (91%) in 
Langas use wells as their main source of water, many of which are located near pit 
latrines (Kimani-Murage & Ngindu 2007). 
 
In short, water supply in urban Kenya is still characterised by low coverage, unreliable 
service, poor financial management, and neglected operation and maintenance. This has 
translated into generally inadequate services which are particularly lacking for the urban 
poor (WASP 2005). 
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3  Water sector reforms in Kenya 
3.1  Background to the water sector reforms in Kenya 
Water governance has been identified as a key issue in water resources management as 
well as water services delivery, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Krhoda 2008). The first 
attempt to ‘reform’ the water sector came as early as 1974 when the first National Water 
Master Plan was launched (Kisima 2007). The primary aim of the Plan was to ensure 
availability of potable water, at a reasonable distance, to all households by the year 2000 
– under the legal framework of Water Act Cap 372. In line with the Plan, the government 
upgraded the Department of Water Development of the Ministry of Agriculture into a 
fully fledged Ministry of Water to coordinate actors involved in the provision of water 
and sanitation services (Mumma 2005; Kisima 2007; Gakuria 2008). However, the 
Ministry lacked financial resources and the Plan was not sustained. As the needs of the 
country changed over time, there were various government policy pronouncements. 
Among them was the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for 
Renewed Growth from which the government spelt out strategies for provision of basic 
services and reforms necessary to accelerate economic growth (see Kenya 1986). 
 
In 1998 the government established the National Water Conservation and Pipeline 
Corporation (NWCPC) to take over the management of government operated water 
supply systems that could be run on a commercial basis. In addition, large municipalities 
were allowed to supply water within their areas. Also allowed to operate were a number 
of donor-funded or supported community self-help water supply projects (Mumma 2005; 
Ngigi & Macharia 2006). Although nominally autonomous with the opportunity for 
commercial orientation, NWCPC failed to attain financial viability or to improve 
provision of water supply as originally envisaged. Neither could the local authorities do 
any better. 
 
The idea of water sector reforms in Kenya gained momentum (again) in 1999 following 
the publishing of the Sessional Paper No 1 of 1999 on National Policy on Water 
Resources Management and Development. The paper identified and analyzed the short-
comings in water resources management, water and sewerage development, institutional 
framework and financing of the water sector (Kenya 1999; Gakuria 2008; Krhoda 
2008).22 In other words, the weaknesses in policy, regulation and service provision in the 
previous set-up are the main drivers towards water sector reforms. These weaknesses, 
which the sector reforms intend to address, are summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Before the reforms, water supply services were under the Ministry of Water, the local authorities, 
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC), NGOs, self-help groups and CBOs – 
with no policy and very little coordination (Krhoda 2008). 
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Table 2: Bottlenecks in the water sector under Water Act Cap 372 
Policy formulation • Poor co-ordination in the sector 
• Poor policy accountability 
• Poor attention to water resources management 
Regulation • Lack of a clear regulatory framework 
• Lack of monitoring and evaluation 
• Poor performance of water-undertakers 
Service provision • Poor management of water resources (quality and quantity) 
• Failure to attract and retain skilled manpower 
• Inadequate allocation of resources 
• Poor, inefficient and unreliable service delivery 
• Low coverage of water supply and sewerage services 
• Inability to attract investments 
• Dilapidated water supply and sewerage infrastructure 
• High levels of unaccounted-for-water 
• Low revenue collection, including corruption 
Source: Kenya (2006b) 
 
KIWASCO (2007)23 acknowledges that in the past years prior to reforms, the water 
sector has experienced numerous challenges which include: 
• Lack of a comprehensive sector policy or strategy to guide sector organization in the 
performance of their tasks. 
• Unclear roles and responsibilities for the sector leading either to duplication of efforts 
or gaps in some areas. 
• Deteriorating infrastructure as a result of poor maintenance and lack of new invest-
ments. 
• Erratic and insufficient funding by the government and local authorities. 
• Increasing pollution of water resources. 
• Non-existence of comprehensive legislative framework for managing water. 
• Lack of sector policy on water resources management and water supply and sanita-
tion. 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement and ownership by consumers and users. 
 
Even then, reforming the water supply and sanitation services in towns may not 
necessarily be as new as the Water Act 2002. The first efforts started in 1987 with the 
creation of Urban Water and Sanitation Management Project (UWASAM), supported by the 
German Development Organisation GTZ. Three municipalities – Kitale, Kericho and 
Nyahururu – were targeted during the pilot phase (1987-1993) that consisted largely of the 
establishment of Water and Sanitation Departments (WSDs) in these towns. During the 
                                                 
23 Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company that is in charge of providing water and sewerage services in 
Kisumu municipality. 
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subsequent phase (1994-1996), the project was extended to five more municipalities24 and 
aimed at staff training and technology transfer, adopting cost covering tariffs, and attending 
to the maintenance requirements of the water systems (Onjala 2002). 
 
However, the project was not very successful, as “the WSDs remained unsatisfactory in 
terms of service quality, water loss targets, revenue collection efficiency, and flexibility in 
responding to consumer needs for increased demand and expansion of the distribution 
network” (ibid: 163). Moreover, the WSDs were not permitted to control their own financial 
affairs; hence the option advanced by the German donor to create water companies, wholly 
owned by the municipalities but fully responsible for their own (financial) affairs.25 
 
Onjala (2002) continues to elaborate that during a workshop in 1995 between the pilot 
towns, the Ministry of Water and GTZ, it was decided to create Water and Sewerage 
Companies (WSCs) as a step towards commercialisation. These WSCs were set up along 
the normal lines of a private company, with shareholders, a Board of Directors and a 
corporate management team (the latter consisting of a Managing Director, a Commercial 
Manager and a Technical Manager). The municipal council is the sole owner of the com-
pany because it owns all shares,26 thus exercising control over the company (officially 
through the annual general meeting). The ultimate authority, however, lies with the Board of 
Directors, as it “reviews the overall strategy, monitors and controls, considers significant 
issues and fulfils statutory duties” (ibid: 164). It also appoints the Managing Director. The 
Board brings together representatives from the municipality, the state and stakeholders,27 
thus giving it a ‘democratic’ outlook. Three municipalities were selected to start with: 
Eldoret, Nyeri and Nakuru. 
 
Owuor et al. (2006) attribute these efforts to the persistent failure and inability of most local 
authorities in the provision of water supply and sanitation services. Most local authorities 
faced, and continued to face, a number of persistent problems in water supply and 
management: frequent water shortages and wastage, high unaccounted-for-water, illegal 
connections, mismanagement of funds from water bills, non-reading of meters, and non-
payment of water, among others. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Thika. 
25 The example being the Chipata Water and Sewerage Company Limited in Zambia. 
26 In practice, the Municipal Council owns all but three of the 5,000 shares (99.94%), as the Mayor, the 
Town Clerk and the Municipal Treasurer all have one share. This was done to satisfy the requirements of 
Section 4 of the Companies Act (Onjala 2002: 163). 
27 These are: the Mayor, the Town Clerk, the Municipal Treasurer, the Managing Director of the company, 
representatives from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and the Ministry of Local Government, and 
representatives from the business community, women’s organisations and water consumers (Onjala 2002: 
164). 
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3.2  The Water Act 2002 
With the adoption of the Water Act 2002, all Kenyan municipalities are obliged to reform 
their water services along ‘business’ lines. The key word is ‘commercialisation’: water is not 
only a social good but also an economic good and water services have to be managed “in 
accordance with sound business principles” (Section 57(5)(d) of the Water Act – Kenya 
2002). Sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Act laid the foundation for the National Water 
Resources Management Strategy (NWRMS – 2006-2008) (Kenya 2006a).28 The overall goal 
of the Strategy is “to eradicate poverty through the provision of potable water for human 
consumption and water for productive use” (ibid: 4). 
 
The document specifies ten “specific objectives” (ibid: 4-6, 9-17). Among these are the 
following: 
1. Equal access to water for all Kenyans. This shall be recognised as one of the most 
immediate issues to be addressed. There is need to develop mechanisms that will in-
volve all stakeholders in the planning and development of water resources so as to 
ensure that every sector, including the poor, has appropriate access to water. 
2. Enhance and strengthen the role of gender. A gender approach in water resources 
management is based on the rationale that (…) men and women do not have the same 
access and control over resources. Gender sensitisation is important at all levels but 
above all at the decision-making levels. To remove the stereotyping and the regressive 
notions on women’s involvement in the water sector, it is important that people are 
sensitised on the different needs, opportunities and constraints of men and women in the 
water sector. 
3. Manage the demand of water in a sustainable way. This includes market-based and 
technology-based strategies. The two major market-based strategies are water pricing 
(“the user pays” principle, with special treatment of low-income users) and effluent 
charges (“the polluter pays” principle). One of the technology-based strategies concerns 
the reduction of unaccounted-for-water. 
4. Private sector financing and self-financing. This opens the way to participation of the 
private sector, civil society and communities in the management and development of 
water resources. Private sector involvement will be largely in the form of public-private 
partnerships. The companies bring in management expertise, technical skills and credit 
standing to finance investments. The partnership can be fulfilled in different forms, such 
as service, management, and lease contracts, concessions and joint ownership.29 Self-
financing includes financing through the money market; a source of funding that has not 
been extensively used for the water sector development by the government. Government 
                                                 
28 The NWRMS (2006-2008) is also based on three other policy papers: (a) Sessional Paper No 1 of 1999 
on National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development; (b) the Economic Recovery for 
Wealth and Employment Creation Strategy (2003-2007); and (c) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (see 
Kenya 2006a: 3). 
29 With this strategy, the government moves a step further than the ‘co-operative model’ and opens the door 
to real participation of the private sector. 
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financing should focus on those areas of the water sector that can not be operated on a 
commercial basis and should support the targeted subsidies of the sector. 
5. Water pricing that recognises water as an economic good. Social and political consider-
ations outweighed the economic considerations in the setting of tariffs such that water is 
largely considered a social good. The need to have a different view on the pricing of 
water becomes urgent, so increasingly, water is now (also) viewed as an economic good. 
This necessitates the development of appropriate tariff structures and cost recovery 
measures. In order to gain acceptance, the water pricing system should be developed 
with the full consultation of water users. 
 
In short, water is considered by the Kenyan government as both a social and an economic 
good, to be available for all Kenyans and at a price reflecting its market value (cost 
recovery). The government also recognises that the poor cannot afford to pay such prices, a 
problem that has to be solved by subsidised rates. Conspicuously missing in the Strategy is 
any remark on legalisation (and regulation) of small-scale water vendors (individual water 
sellers, water kiosks, etc.). In as far as water kiosks exist, it concerns partnerships between 
the municipal authorities and CBOs (and possibly also NGOs). Further, the government 
stresses the importance of involvement of all stakeholders – including consumers, and 
women in particular – in the management of the country’s water resources. 
 
In the Strategy, the government accepts the possibility of increased private sector partici-
pation, in terms of various types of contracts with private companies. However, up to now 
reforms in the Kenyan water sector have taken the form of the co-operative model. There-
fore, according to Professor George Krhoda,30 “the right word is not privatisation but 
commercialisation of the water sector; i.e. the municipal water boards are to behave like 
companies: increase rates, collect revenues, get loans on the capital market, and have 
professional managers from the private sector. Nairobi is an example: after a well-paid 
manager was installed, revenues rose with 100% due to better collection.” 
 
Importantly, “through commercialisation, the Water Act 2002 requires local authorities to 
form autonomous water and sewerage companies with independent Boards of Directors to 
provide water services and re-invest (ring-fence) water revenues in service delivery 
improvement” (Wambua 2004: 7). Thus, Kenya’s water reforms have so far been in line 
with K’Akumu’s (2004: 217) notion that “in terms of economic theory, privatisation 
would not necessarily present an advantage over public enterprise, and privatisation is not 
a pre-condition for efficient management”. Especially with regard to expanding provision 
for lower-income groups, experiences in water privatisation in low- and middle-income 
countries have proved disappointing (ibid). Carpenter (2003) suggests that the future of 
privatisation of water in low-income countries lies with the small-scale providers. 
                                                 
30 Professor George Krhoda, personal communication, 18 June 2007. Professor Krhoda was Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Water Resources Management and Development during 2003-2005 and in this 
function he was in charge of the Kenyan water sector reforms. 
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3.3  The institutional set-up of water sector reforms in Kenya 
The Water Act 2002, which became effective on 18 March 2003, provides the legal 
framework for the implementation of the water sector reforms based on the following 
guiding principles: 
• The separation of water resources management from water supply and sewerage ser-
vices. 
• The institutional separation of policy formulation, regulation and service provision 
functions.31 
• Decentralisation, participation, autonomy, accountability, efficiency, affordability and 
sustainability. For example, (-) decentralisation of services to the regional and local 
levels, i.e. to the Water Services Boards, Water Service Providers, Catchment Areas 
Advisory Committees, and Water Resources Users Associations; (-) participation of 
all the stakeholders; (-) financial and operational autonomy of the Water Service 
Providers; and (-) financial and ecological sustainability in the management of water 
resources. 
• Institutionalising support to the financing of water services for under served areas, i.e. 
the Water Services Trust Fund. 
• Establishing mechanism for handling disputes in the water sector, i.e. the Water 
Appeal Board. 
 
Figure 1 presents the ‘famous triangle’ summarising the institutional set-up of water 
sector reforms under the Water Act 2002 while Table 3 is a summary of the roles and 
responsibilities of institutions in the sector reforms. As said before, the reforms aim at 
addressing the weaknesses that face(d) the water sector by separating policy functions 
from regulation and services delivery. It further separates service delivery functions into 
asset holding (ownership) and investment and direct water and sewerage services pro-
vision. 
 
The Act provides for the establishment of 3 levels of institutions for the provision of 
water supply and sewerage services: Water Services Regulatory Board, Water Services 
Boards, and Water Service Providers. On the other hand, the management of water 
resources is under Water Resources Management Authority and Water Resources User 
Associations. Water Resources Management Authority executes its mandate through the 
Catchment Areas Advisory Committees whose membership consists of government 
officials, stakeholders and the community. Two of these institutions – Water Services 
Boards and Water Service Providers – are further discussed below as they are directly 
concerned with the provision of water supply in towns. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation transferred functions, responsibilities, assets and equipments to 
these new institutions with effect from 1 July 2005. 
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Figure 1: The institutional set-up of water sector reforms under Water Act 2002 
Source: MWI (2005); Kenya (2006b). 
 
 
Expected outcomes of water sector reforms 
It is expected that the clear roles and responsibilities defined to sector actors will result in 
improved water sector performance. At the policy formulation level the sector reforms are 
expected to improve coordination in the water sector, enhance clear policy accountability, 
and give more attention to water resources management. At the regulation level the sector 
reforms are expected to set in place a clear regulatory framework, enhance monitoring 
and evaluation, and improve performance of water undertakers. Lastly, the expected 
outcomes at the service provision level include improved management of water resources 
(quantity and quality), ability to attract and retain skilled manpower, improved and 
efficient service delivery, increased coverage, ability to attract investments, and improved 
infrastructure.32 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Mumma (2005) for a legal interpretation and critical analysis of the Water Act 2002. 
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Table 3: Roles and responsibilities of institutions in the sector reforms 
Institution Roles and responsibilities 
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation 
Policy formulation, sector coordination, monitoring, financing and 
supervision. 
Water Resources 
Management Authority 
Regulation of water resources management through (-) developing 
principles, guidelines and procedures for the allocation of water 
resources; (-) assessing water resources potential; (-) determining and 
monitoring permits for water use; (-) regulating and protecting water 
resources; (-) determining water user charges and fees from source; 
and (-) maintaining a database on water resources. 
Water Services 
Regulatory Board 
Regulation of water and sewerage services through (-) issuance and 
monitoring of licenses for the provision of water; (-) determining and 
monitoring standards for the provision of water services to 
consumers; (-) providing procedures for handling and dealing with 
complaints from consumers; and (-) developing tariff guidelines for 
the provision of water services. 
Catchment Areas 
Advisory Committees 
Advise the Water Resources Management Authority on issues 
concerning management of water resources at the catchment level. 
Water Services Boards Responsible for the efficient and economical provision of water 
services within their area of jurisdiction through signing of service 
provision agreements with Water Service Providers. 
Water Resources Users 
Associations 
Provides a forum for conflict resolution and cooperative management 
of water resources in designated catchment areas. In other words, it 
enables the public and communities to participate in managing water 
resources within their catchment areas. 
Water Service Providers Direct provision of water and sewerage services as agents of Water 
Services Boards. 
Water Appeal Board Handle disputes in the water sector. 
Water Services Trust Support financing of pro-poor water services in unserved areas. 
National Water 
Conservation and 
Pipeline Corporation 
Bulk water supply, dam construction, flood control, land drainage, 
ground water development and Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
reserve Water Service Provider. 
Kenya Water Institute Training and research 
Source: MWI (2005). 
 
Water Services Boards (WSBs) 
There are seven WSBs in Kenya: Athi Water Services Board, Tana Water Services 
Board, Northern Water Services Board, Coast Water Services Board, Rift Valley Water 
Services Board, Lake Victoria North Water Services Board, and Lake Victoria South 
Water Services Board (see Table 4 and Map 1).33 WSBs were created to take full 
responsibility for the provision of water services through signing of Service Provision 
                                                 
33 There are unconfirmed reports that another WSB was formed in the last quarter of 2008. 
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Agreements with Water Service Providers. According to the Act, they are the legal 
owners of water and sewerage assets in their areas of jurisdiction. As such, they are 
responsible for the planning, development and expansion of water and sewerage services. 
They contract water and sewerage services provision to Water Service Providers and 
monitor service delivery as well as having powers to lease assets, from their owners, for 
water service provision (WASREB 2008: 2). According to Krhoda (2008), the WSBs 
have the following functions: 
• Capacity building of communities to start water provision as a business. 
• Carrying out competitive selection of service providers. 
• Drawing up of service provision agreements. 
• Clustering of the spaghetti lines34 to known off-take and metered points to eliminate 
water losses through illegal connections. 
• Elimination of cartels by setting tariffs – regulation. 
• Ensuring equitable distribution of water through zoning of community service pro-
viders and enforcing service standards as stipulated in the service provision agree-
ments. 
 
Table 4: Some characteristics of Water Services Boards in Kenya 
Service board Area
(in km2)
Population
(2006)
Districts covered 
Athi Water Services 
Board 
40,130 6,804,386 Nairobi, Kiambu, Thika, Machakos, Kajiado 
and Makueni 
Tana Water Services 
Board 
52,777 5,161,225 Nyeri, Muranga, Maragua, Kirinyaga, Embu, 
Meru Central, Meru South, Meru North, 
Mbeere, Tharaka, Mwingi and Kitui 
Northern Water 
Services Board 
232,737 2,059,283 Isiolo, Moyale, Laikipia, Samburu, Marsabit, 
Garissa, Ijara, Wajir and Mandera 
Coast Water Services 
Board 
82,816 2,975,387 Kwale, Taita Taveta, Kilifi, Malindi, 
Mombasa, Lamu and Tana River 
Rift Valley Water 
Services Board 
113,771 4,309,551 Narok, Koibatek, Keiyo, West Pokot, 
Turkana, Nakuru, Nyandarua, Baringo and 
Marakwet 
Lake Victoria North 
Water Services Board 
16,977 6,556,763 Vihiga, Kakamega, Lugari, Butere, Mumias, 
Busia, Teso, Bungoma, Mt. Elgon, Trans 
Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Samburu 
Lake Victoria South 
Water Services Board 
20,340 6,868,876 Nyando, Siaya, Bondo, Homa Bay, Migori, 
Suba, Kuria, Kisii, Nyamira, Gucha, Kericho, 
Kisumu, Bomet, Transmara, Bureti, North 
Nandi, and South Nandi 
Source: WASREB (2008: 2, Table 1.1). 
 
                                                 
34 Multiple consumer connections not connected to the existing master operator line. 
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         Map 1: Water Services Boards in Kenya 
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Water Service Providers (WSPs) 
The actual water service delivery to the consumers is done by the WSPs. The Act 
requires that a Water Services Board enters into a contract with a WSP through signing 
the Service Provision Agreement. In other words, the direct service providers are WSPs 
and not Water Services Boards. There are three categories of WSPs; (1) urban water 
service providers, which are incorporated as limited liability companies owned by one or 
more local authorities; (2) community water supplies which are managed by WSPs but 
registered as Water Resources User Associations by the Registrar of Societies; and (3) 
private WSPs which include NGOs and private organizations (Kisima 2008). 
 
Under the Act, autonomous water and sanitation (or sewerage) companies – WASCOs – 
are given the responsibility to provide water and sanitation services within urban areas. 
The lead partners in this venture are the local authorities. The WASCOs operate within 
the jurisdiction and oversight of the Water Services Boards, instrumental in their 
registration and incorporation. The WASCOs are expected to be managed on commercial 
principles, including signing performance contracts, cost-recovery, and sustainability 
within a context of efficiency, operational and financial autonomy, accountability and 
strategic, but minor, investments. They are supposed to improve access to water and 
sanitation services for poverty reduction and sustainable development. In fact the core 
mandate of the WASCOs is to provide effective, efficient, adequate and safe water to 
customers and to collect, treat and dispose sewage in a safe and environmentally friendly 
manner. 
3.4  Two examples 
NYEWASCO: An example of a ‘success’ story35 
Nyeri Water and Sewerage Company (NYEWASCO) is a shining example of how 
successful privatisation of water and sanitation services can be in Kenya’s local autho-
rities. In 1982, the Municipal Council of Nyeri took over the provision of water services 
from the central government. Because of its inadequacy, a Water and Sewerage Department 
was created in 1995. This did not make things better, however, mainly because water 
revenues went to the municipal council treasury and were often diverted to non-water areas. 
As a result, burst pipes could not be repaired and water services could not be extended to 
match population growth. With support from GTZ, the Nyeri Water and Sewerage Com-
pany was created as an independent company in 1997. With GTZ’s technical inputs and the 
willingness of the Municipal Council of Nyeri to free its grip on the water department,36 
NYEWASCO started its operations the following year. 
 
                                                 
35 This section is based on Wambua (2004: 12-13); UN-HABITAT (2006: 80) and Owuor et al. (2006: 33-
35). 
36 Under the agreement between the municipal council and NYEWASCO, relations between the two parties 
were regulated, the whole water infrastructure valued at more than 500 million Kenyan shillings was 
passed on to NYEWASCO, and it absorbed all staff from the municipal council’s water department. 
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Photo 1: Nyeri Water and Sewerage Company Offices 
Photo: Sam Owuor 
 
By 2003, even before the enforcement of the Water Act 2002, some of NYEWASCO’s 
accomplishments were: 
• Being run on strict corporate lines with revenue from water ploughed back into im-
proving water and sewerage provision. 
• Increasing the number of registered connections with 26% between December 1999 and 
March 2003 as well as increasing the number of metered connections. 
• Substantially improving the billing and revenue collection, i.e. the efficiency of revenue 
collection has risen to 98% (in 2006) from the previous 60% when the company took 
over the management of water services in the municipality. 
• Customer satisfaction with the quality of the water and with the company’s customer 
care. 
• Increasing the Kamakwa water treatment works production capacity by 50%. 
• Reduced complaints about water turbidity. 
• Prompt action to and repair of reported water pipe bursts and other breakages. 
• Establishment of water kiosks in the low-income settlements of the municipality. 
• Reducing water losses from 55% to about 40%. 
 
However, according to Wambua (2004: 13), the company still “needs to develop an 
elaborate conservation plan for sustainable management of water resources”. That does not 
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mean that the company is not pursuing environmentally-conscious undertaking. For in-
stance, it changed its main service of water from Nairobi River – which was drying up 
because of farming activities upstream – to Itooni River, hence saving the river that flows all 
the way to the Kenyan capital. 
 
NYEWASCO is a success story because of four main reasons: 
1. The company has received a lot of support from the municipal council. 
2. The company functions professionally and autonomously, without political interfer-
ence. 
3. The company recognises the need to equip its staff with the necessary skills to 
perform well. As such, the company has trained all the staff they inherited from the 
council. 
4. The company recognises the needs of the population. They involve the community in 
their activities to provide them with a sense of ownership. 
 
NYEWASCO has effectively demonstrated among others that: 
• Team work and cooperation among civic leaders, chief officers, the private sector and 
the general public are cornerstones to sustainable service delivery with a human face. 
• Good governance (i.e. transparency and accountability) is a key component to pro-
poor service delivery. 
• Improved water and sanitation services and predictable delivery system can be 
achieved in Kenyan local authorities. 
• Social responsibility is important in any organisation. 
• Pro-poor programmes are compatible with commercialisation of basic services. 
• Improved communication does lead to sustained support from customers, suppliers 
and others. 
 
NYAWASCO: A case of ‘exemplary’ performance of a small Water Service Provider37 
Nyahururu Water and Sewerage Company (NYAWASCO) has not only emerged (in 
2008) as the best performing Water Service Provider in the category of small Water 
Service Providers but has also emerged as the best overall company nationally.38 The 
company’s exemplary performance is summarised in the following quote: 
 
“Nyahururu district hospital used to witness at least thirty cases of water borne cholera every 
week. Commuters passing through Nyahururu were always being reminded not to take tap water 
while in the town. That is now a thing of the past thanks to Nyahururu Water and Sewerage 
Company which has revolutionized the quality of services being received by the customers” 
(WASREB 2008: 39). 
 
                                                 
37 This section is quoted from WASREB (2008: 39-40). 
38 See WASREB (2008) for details of rankings and analysis. 
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According to the analysis, WASREB (ibid) attributes this exemplary performance to a 
number of factors, among them: 
• Improvement in the quality of services being rendered to the customers. 
• Hard work, discipline, full commitment, and proactive approach in achieving the 
objectives set by the company. 
• Good corporate governance and principle of inclusivity. 
• Increased coverage, pro-poor focus, longer hours of supply, and guaranteed quality of 
water through scheduled quality checks. 
• Customer satisfaction through improved billing, communication and swift action to 
reported problems and complaints. 
• Maintaining optimal staff ratios. 
• Good will from the customers, the Board and other stakeholders due to their growing 
confidence on the company. 
• High revenue collection efficiency. 
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4  Water sector interventions in urban Kenya 
 
Besides the water sector reforms laid down by the government in the Water Act 2002 and 
the National Water Resources Management Strategy 2006-2008, sector interventions by 
NGOs and international donors are also taking place in both rural and urban Kenya. Perhaps 
the most far-fetching intervention project in urban Kenya is the Lake Victoria Region Water 
and Sanitation Initiative being implemented by UN-HABITAT. Generally, water sector 
interventions can take the form of local (intra-urban) initiatives, for instance to establish a 
water kiosk in a low-income neighbourhood with the (financial) assistance of an NGO. But 
interventions can also target a whole municipality or even a whole region, for instance the 
rehabilitation and/or improvement of the water (and sanitation) infrastructure. 
 
Kenya has a long record of cooperation with development partners in the water sector 
including Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), World Bank, German Development Agency 
(KFW/GTZ), French Agency for Development (AFD), United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Department for International 
Development (DFID), African Development Bank (ADB), Finnish Development Agency 
(FINNIDA), and the European Union (EU), among others. Currently, International 
Development agency (IDA) and French Agency for Development (AFD) are interested in 
supporting commercialisation of water utilities serving main urban centres (Nairobi and 
Mombasa) while the German cooperation (KFW) is focusing on commercialisation of 
water utilities in medium-sized urban centres. Japan is interested in supporting smaller 
urban centres and rural areas, Denmark, Finland and Belgium aim to cooperate on rural 
water supply, and the African Development Bank (ADB) is financing projects in urban 
areas (Kenya 2006b: 193). 
4.1  Two examples 
Rift Valley Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
The Rift Valley Water Supply and Sanitation Project is largely funded by the African 
Development Fund. The objective of the project is “to improve water supply and sanitation 
services in urban, peri-urban and rural communities within the service area of the Rift 
Valley Water Services Board” (Meijer 2005: 73). The project has two main components. 
The first one concerns the improvement of the water and sanitation infrastructure. For 
instance, water availability in Nakuru municipality will be improved from 6 to 24 hours a 
day, while sanitation services will be improved in Naivasha, Gilgil, Molo, Njoro and 
Elburgon. The second component concerns institutional support for the Rift Valley Water 
Services Board and the Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services Company, leading, amongst 
others, to regular billing, more efficient revenue collection (from about 60% to 90%), a 
reduction of the level of unaccounted-for-water from the current 70% to 25%, and cost 
recovery charges in place by project completion in 2008. 
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Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation (LVWATSAN) Initiative 
UN-HABITAT, in association with the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and 
with financial support from the government of the Netherlands, is currently implementing 
a major initiative (herein referred to as programme) to address the water and sanitation 
needs of the people, particularly the poor, in the secondary towns around Lake Victoria.39 
The programme, which involves a mix of investments in the rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure and capacity building at local level, is designed to assist the people in the 
Lake Victoria towns to meet the water and sanitation related MDGs (UN-HABITAT 
2007; 2008). In addition, the programme was designed to contribute to equitable and 
sustainable economic, social and environmental development of the Lake Victoria region, 
to the benefit of the inhabitants. The specific objectives of the programme (UN-
HABITAT 2008) are: 
1. Promote pro-poor water and sanitation investments in the secondary urban centres in 
the Lake Victoria region. 
2. Support development of institutional and human resource capacities at local and 
regional levels for the sustainable delivery of improved water and sanitation services. 
3. Facilitate realisation of upstream water sector reforms at the local level in the parti-
cipating urban centres. 
4. Reduce the environmental impact of urbanisation in the Lake Victoria basin. 
 
The programme is being implemented in two phases. The first phase concerns short-term 
interventions for immediate impact, including capacity building and training, while the 
second phase emphasizes long-term interventions.40 Seven towns have been selected for 
the first phase of the project: Homa-Bay and Kisii in Kenya, Masaka and Kyotera in 
Uganda, Bukoba and Muleba in Tanzania, and the border town of Mutukula (ibid).41 The 
first phase, which focused on rehabilitation of water supply sources, extending water 
supplies to the poor areas and constructing sanitation facilities, was designed to have an 
immediate impact in improving water and sanitation services (UN-HABITAT 2007). It 
also includes supporting the programme towns to enhance efficiency in the collection and 
disposal of solid waste. 
 
In Kisii and Homa Bay, four contracts totalling US$ 617,000 have been signed for the 
supply, delivery and installation of pipelines and meters and solid waste handling 
equipments. The contract also includes rehabilitation of treatment works, construction of 
public water kiosks and construction of integrated sanitation facilities in schools and 
public institutions (ibid). Table 5 presents the successfully completed projects in Homa 
Bay and Kisii. 
                                                 
39 Some of the information presented in this section is from one of the (undated) LVWATSAN Initiative 
(information) pamphlet. 
40 The first phase of these interventions was scheduled to be completed in December 2008. 
41 Long-term activities in phase 2 shall be extended to include Bondo in Kenya, Bunda in Tanzania and 
Bugembe in Uganda (UN-HABITAT 2008). 
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Table 5: The LVWATSAN’s successfully completed projects in Homa Bay and Kisii 
Homa Bay Kisii 
• Rehabilitation of both old and new intakes 
and installation of new pumps. 
• Rehabilitation of the treatment works at 
Makongeni. 
• Laying of approximately 1 km of PVC 
pipeline. 
• Installation of 10 tipping bins and 4 waste 
transfer stations. 
• Construction of 10 VIP latrines42 in 
selected schools and public area. 
• Construction of a number of water kiosks 
in low-income settlements. 
• Rehabilitation of the intake works at 
Kegati. 
• Laying of 10 km distribution pipeline. 
• Construction of 10 public water kiosks. 
• Construction of 10 VIP latrines. 
Source: UN-HABITAT (2008) 
 
With a clear pro-poor focus, the LVWATSAN programme is intended to generate 
desirable outcomes with a lasting impact on the lives of the poor. These outcomes include 
improved access to water, sanitation, solid waste management and drainage services in 
the project areas; functional and gender focused strategies for sustainable management 
and monitoring of rehabilitated systems; institutionalised capacity building; and a con-
tribution to the reduction in pollutant loads entering Lake Victoria (UN-HABITAT 2007; 
2008). It is also hoped that the programme towns will provide a model for national 
authorities and donors, including international financing institutions, to replicate in other 
towns in the region (UN-HABITAT 2008).43 
 
To encourage ownership at the local level, the LVWATSAN programme is working 
closely with the so-called multi-stakeholder forums. These forums bring together all 
possible stakeholders, such as representatives of local authorities; water and sanitation 
service providers; NGOs, CBOs and Faith Based Organisation (FBOs); private sector; 
water vendor associations; media; and poor women and men, the elderly, youth, orphans 
and other vulnerable groups, among others. The multi-stakeholder forums facilitate the 
active participation of a broad range of stakeholders at town level, in the design and 
implementation of the programme interventions. The specific objectives of the multi-
stakeholder forums include: 
• To incorporate the voices of the poor communities with regard to their priorities and 
preferences into decision-making process. 
                                                 
42 Ventilated, improved pit latrines. 
43 The programme will be replicated in 15 additional towns in 5 countries with Rwanda and Burundi being 
included as new countries (UN-HABITAT 2008). 
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• To promote partnerships between the stakeholders and to ensure accountability and 
transparency. 
• To discuss and determine local capacity building requirements, technological options 
and service levels that the poor can afford and are willing to pay for. 
• To develop an income-generation strategy for poor communities through the provi-
sion of services developed by the programme. 
• To build consensus on locational and service priorities requiring programme inter-
vention. 
• To develop local working plans, and establish modalities for stakeholder involvement 
in monitoring and evaluation. 
  
The rationale for setting up these forums is to ensure that the interventions under the 
LVWATSAN programme are developed and implemented in a manner that is informed 
by and responds to the needs of the local stakeholders. Through regular communication 
and feedback, the forums also ensure that stakeholders understand and support the 
achievement of the goals and objectives of the programme. 
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5  Report of a preliminary tour of five towns 
 
The information presented in this section is based on a preliminary tour of five towns in 
Kenya, namely Eldoret, Kisumu, Homa Bay, Kisii and Nakuru (see Map 2). These towns 
were selected on the basis of their different stages in water reforms and the water sector 
interventions being implemented by the UN-HABITAT’s Lake Victoria Region Water 
and Sanitation Initiative, particularly in Homa Bay and Kisii. The objective was to get an 
impression of the state of affairs regarding water sector reforms and interventions in 
urban Kenya and its impact on the low-income parts of the local population. The preli-
minary tour involved interviews with only a few officials from the water and sanitation 
companies and other stakeholders in each town.44 As such, we were not able to always 
cross-check some of the data. The interviews, conducted during the month of October 
2008, covered six broad issues: (1) organization and management; (2) network coverage; 
(3) unaccounted-for-water; (4) metering, billing and revenue; (5) pro-poor programmes; 
and (6) water sector interventions. The interviews were complemented with a guided tour 
of selected sections and projects in the municipalities. 
5.1  Eldoret 
Eldoret is located in the Rift Valley Province, about 330 km north-west of Nairobi. 
Eldoret, the administrative headquarters of Uasin Gishu District, is one of the fastest 
growing towns in Kenya with a population of about 200,000 people (1999 census). The 
notable low-income neighbourhoods in the municipality are Langas, Huruma, and some 
parts of Kamukunji. Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company (ELDOWAS) is mandated to 
supply water and sanitation services in the municipality. The residents also depend on 
other alternative sources of water, namely shallow wells and roof catchment. The 
municipality does not have any NGO, CBO or agency actively involved in water 
interventions at the local level. However, ELDOWAS may once-in-a-while depend on a 
Dutch NGO, SNV, for informed research. In 2007, for example, SNV conducted a survey 
of water vendors in the town and the results shared with ELDOWAS. 
5.1.1  Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company (ELDOWAS) 
Organization and management 
ELDOWAS was incorporated as a company in 1997 and started operations in 1999. 
Before that, water supply services in Eldoret were undertaken by Eldoret Municipal 
Council’s Department of Water and Sewerage. In line with the Water Act 2002, 
ELDOWAS was mandated to operate commercially, with more focus on customers. The 
revenue from the sale of water was supposed to be ploughed back to maintain and expand 
the existing water supply system. 
                                                 
44 See acknowledgement. 
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Map 2: Location of the five towns 
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Whereas ELDOWAS is on paper a private company, it is 100% publicly owned by the 
Eldoret Municipal Council – but with its operations wholly independent. The company is 
run by a Board of Directors in which various stakeholders are represented, such as the 
Kenya Association of Manufacturers, women’s groups, Moi University45, the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Law Society of Kenya as well as three council 
representatives, i.e. the Mayor, the Town Clerk and the Treasurer. 
 
Despite the ownership and strong representation from the municipal council, ELDOWAS 
is answerable to Lake Victoria North Water Services Board (LVNWSB)46 and not to the 
municipal council as it were before the establishment of Water Services Boards under the 
Water Act 2002. According to the District Water Officer, Eldoret47, the influence of 
Eldoret municipality in the day-to-day operations of ELDOWAS “is quite minimal 
nowadays”. For any new investment, approval from the LVNWSB is required, implying 
more bureaucracy that it was intended to reduce. Projects are done on a consultancy basis 
through competitive bidding. Furthermore, ELDOWAS cannot negotiate for a bank loan 
on its own. 
 
Coverage of water supply network 
While the company’s operations are strictly supposed to be within Eldoret municipality, 
ELDOWAS was allowed to extend its services 10 km beyond the municipality boun-
daries. As much as about 60% of Eldoret municipality is covered by the water supply 
network, the coverage decreases away from the central business district, which is fairly 
well connected. In the low-income settlements, it is a mixed scenario: some parts are 
(partially or well) covered, while others are not covered at all. For example in Langas, 
one of the largest informal settlements in Eldoret, the need for household connections has 
increased to the extent that the existing water kiosks have been rendered functionally 
redundant.48 
 
Before extending piped water supply connection to this area, the residents were largely 
served by 10 water kiosks provided by ELDOWAS but given to interest groups or 
individuals to operate. Only one of them, largely surviving from car washing activities, 
was operational at the time of this interview49. The gentleman who operates this kiosk 
charged Ksh 50 for every car washed and Ksh 3 for a 20-litre container of water for 
individuals. He explained that he was able to survive and make his livelihood through 
this business. He was billed on a monthly basis according to the amount of water 
consumed. However, since these water kiosks were constructed on permanent structures 
they are impossible to relocate to other needy areas. ELDOWAS is now planning to (in 
                                                 
45 Moi University is currently the institutional representative in the Board. 
46 ELDOWAS is one of the water service providers that falls under LVNWSB. 
47 Interview, 9 October 2008. 
48 This does not imply that every plot or household has an individual connection. 
49 10 October 2008. 
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future) construct portable prefabricated water kiosks, which are easier to move to another 
location when the situation of piped water connections improves in an area of operation. 
 
Despite being relatively well connected with water – except for the recently settled 
Kasarani area – Langas suffers from lack of sewer facilities. As such, the focus in this 
settlement and in other parts of Eldoret is the provision of on-site sanitation facilities and 
extending sewer connections to areas that do not have one. Unlike water supply, many 
parts of the municipality are not connected to the main sewer line. According to the 
District Water Officer, Eldoret50, piped water supply in Eldoret is generally reliable.51 
The tariff is relatively low, water pressure is high and water is supplied through gravity 
flow.52 Although roof catchment is not common at household level, it is encouraged for 
institutions. Whereas some residents may be using shallow wells, the quality of water is 
questionable during the rainy season when overflow from nearby pit latrines may 
contaminate water in the shallow wells. 
 
Unaccounted-for-water 
The daily water supply is about 30,000 m3. The level of unaccounted-for-water varies 
monthly and is currently estimated to be 30-40%. This is slightly higher than the tolerated 
set guidelines of up to 25%. The unaccounted-for-water is a result of both technical and 
commercial losses. Technical losses occur through leakages and pipe bursts while 
commercial losses occur through inefficient, incorrect and false meter readings and 
billing. As a result, unaccounted-for-water is not only prevalent in low-income 
settlements where the likelihood of commercial losses is high, but also in the central 
business district where ageing pipes are common. Some of the pipes date back to the 
1920s. 
 
Metering, billing and revenue 
Although revenue collected from water is still low, about 70% of the total connections 
pay their bills. The rates depend on the amount of water consumed by a customer. For 
domestic consumption, consumers are charged Ksh 110 for up to 10 m3 of water 
consumed. The tariff structure is progressive – the more water one consumes, the more 
one pays. Even then, ELDOWAS water kiosks have subsidized tariffs. ELDOWAS water 
kiosks charge Ksh 0.50 (fifty cents) for a 20-litre container of water while individually 
run water kiosks charge Ksh 5 for the same amount of water. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Interview, 9 October 2008. 
51 ELDOWAS is the first and so far the only Water Service Provider to get an ISO 9001:2000 certification 
for being in the right path of achieving its aim of providing quality drinking water and sewer disposal 
services (LVNWSB 2008).  
52 ELDOWAS is a “gravity scheme” as opposed to a “pumping scheme” which is relatively expensive. 
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Pro-poor programmes 
According to the Service Area Manager of ELDOWAS53, pro-poor programme in water 
and sanitation is a ministerial directive in favour of the poor. There is no policy document 
detailing what it is all about. It is therefore not clear how to jump-start a pro-poor project. 
The mandate is left to the individual water company to decide on the most appropriate 
pro-poor actions they may wish to undertake. In Eldoret, the pro-poor programme in 
water and sanitation is geared towards improving the water and sanitation situation in the 
low-income settlements. Through the sector investment planning, ELDOWAS is carrying 
out an inventory of the status of water and sanitation situation and toilet facilities in the 
low-income settlements. 
 
The pro-poor programme is set to have both short- and long-term interventions. Short-
term interventions are targeted at sensitisation campaigns54 to encourage the utilisation of 
existing main sewer connection lines. Two schools (Huruma Primary and Seminary 
Secondary) have been identified in the short-term intervention, namely to be connected to 
the main sewer line. Part of the campaign involves a door-to-door sensitisation through 
Area Development Committees and two youth groups, namely Planet Care and Creative 
Arts for Change. Long-term interventions, which require heavy financial outlay, are 
geared towards extension of water supply facilities and services. Part of the long-term 
intervention is to extend water supply to Kijiji, upper parts of Kamukunji, lower parts of 
Huruma (which already have shallow wells) and to install prefabricated water kiosks in 
Kampi Somali. 
 
As part of the pro-poor programme, sanitation services were, in 2004, extended to 
Huruma and Kamukunji. However, despite the fact that every plot has a provision for a 
sewer connection, its utilization is still quite low. This is largely because the provision for 
a sewer connection needs to be accompanied by an appropriate sanitation system, but 
majority of the landlords in these two neighbourhoods are not keen on upgrading, 
converting or changing their existing sanitation systems (pit latrines) to water borne 
toilets. While this may have cost implications, the Service Area Manager of 
ELDOWAS55 explained that “increased sewer utilisation would require an attitude 
change among the residents and landlords. Specifically, landlords have not been keen on 
sewer provision because they stay away from their rental estates”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Interview, 10 October 2008. 
54 A sensitization campaign was done in Huruma Primary School grounds a day after this interview (10 
October 2008). The campaign, whose theme was “sustainable utilisation of water and sewerage services”, 
was aimed at sensitising the residents on commercialisation of water services, how to handle water related 
complaints and the location of water supply facilities. 
55 Interview, 10 October 2008. 
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5.2  Kisumu 
Kisumu covers an area of 297 km2 with a population of about 500,000 people. It is the 
third largest urban centre in Kenya after Nairobi and Mombasa. It is located in the 
western part of Kenya near Lake Victoria. A large proportion of the municipality’s 
population is concentrated in the low-income settlements of Manyatta, Obunga, 
Nyalenda, Nyawita, Migosi, Bandani, Otonglo and Nyamasaria. Kisumu Water and 
Sewerage Company (KIWASCO) is mandated to provide water and sewerage services to 
the municipality. However, in one of the low-income estates (Manyatta B), a community 
project running in the same principles as KIWASCO but on a much smaller scale is 
supplying water to the people living around its water supply – a borehole. This Wandiege 
Community Water Supply Project is wholly owned, operated and managed by the 
community.56 Even with the existence of KIWASCO and Wandiege, Kisumu residents 
rely on alternative sources of water such as boreholes, river water, lake water, shallow 
wells and handcarts (water vendors). In terms of interventions, it important to note that 
there are a number of NGOs in Kisumu municipality working in various sectors. The 
active NGOs in water and sanitation include Sustainable Aid in Africa International 
(SANA)57, Africa Now, World Vision and CARE Kenya. 
5.2.1  Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO) 
Organization and management 
KIWASCO was set up in 2001, prior to the Water Act 2002, and became operational in 
July 2003 as a limited company after the transformation of the Water and Sewerage 
Department of the Kisumu Municipal Council.58 KIWASCO’s mandate is to effectively 
and efficiently provide adequate water to customers and to collect, treat and dispose 
sewerage in a safe and environment-friendly manner. The company is fully owned by the 
Kisumu Municipal Council. It has a Board of Directors representing council interest, the 
private sector and the government (Ministries of finance, water and local government). 
The company is headed by a Managing Director and four ‘supporting directors’ in charge 
of finance, commercial, human resources and technical departments, respectively – all of 
whom were recruited competitively. The Board discharges its duties through audit, 
human resources and legal affairs, technical and finance committees. According to the 
Municipal Engineer of Kisumu Municipal Council59, KIWASCO is 100% owned by the 
municipal council, who nominates the company’s directors and sets the policy agenda. In 
addition to that, the company’s operations are checked by a community water chair 
appointed by the councillors. S/he is supposed to represent the people’s voice and the 
political interests of the council. 
 
                                                 
56 Wandiege Community Water Supply Project is discussed below. 
57 SANA is discussed below. 
58 During this transformation, KIWASCO inherited the staff of Kisumu Municipal Council’s Water and 
Sewerage Department. 
59 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
 39
Coverage of water supply network 
KIWASCO is mandated to provide water and sewerage services to Kisumu municipality 
but only 32-35% of the total population is served by the water network (i.e. 162,000 
people). There are about 9,000 active water connections and 5,400 sewerage connections 
covering about 40% of the municipality. Most of these connections are concentrated in 
the central business district and Milimani (the high-income part of the municipality). 
These two areas also get water throughout the week unlike in other parts of the 
municipality where water rationing takes place. 
 
KIWASCO produces about 18,000 m3 of water per day, but the demand is estimated to 
be about 45,000 m3 per day. The result has been a severe water shortage. The company 
gets its water from Kibos River (a gravity scheme) and Lake Victoria (a pumping 
scheme). Almost all the water supply (95%) in Kisumu comes from the Lake and has to 
be pumped to the treatment plant in Dunga. Only 5% comes by gravity from Kibos River. 
KIWASCO aims to stabilise this ratio to 55% of the water supply to come from the Lake 
with the remaining (45%) coming from Kibos River. According to the Chief Technical 
Advisor, LVWATSAN-Kenya60, the challenge KIWASCO faces is the receding lake 
level, water treatment and quality issues. 
 
In a move to increase the production of water and the extent of coverage of water and 
sewerage services, KIWASCO is collaborating with the French government in rehabili-
tating the water pumping stations, the water distribution mains as well as improving the 
sewerage system. The first phase of the Ksh 1.6 million project involved improving the 
existing (old) water and sewerage infrastructure while the second phase, which is yet to 
start, targets the expansion of coverage area, especially in water supply. 
 
Unaccounted-for-water 
When KIWASCO started its operations, the unaccounted-for-water was 75%. This has 
reduced to about 62%. The high unaccounted-for-water is attributed to non-functional 
(static) meters, illegal connections as well as burst pipes and leakages. KIWASCO is 
addressing the persistent high percentage of unaccounted-for-water through the newly 
created Department of Supervision and Investigation. It also engages ‘private’ investi-
gators and gives ‘incentives’ to whistle blowers. In addition, the company has instituted 
measures to respond, as-quick-as-possible, to repairs of burst pipes and leakages. For 
example, it is recommended that a burst pipe be repaired within 24 hours of reporting 
while a leakage should take 12 hours. Despite these measures, the legal penalty for illegal 
connections and other tampering of the water supply system by residents is not suffi-
ciently punitive. 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
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Metering, billing and revenue 
The metering ratio is at 100% and revenue collection efficiency has increased from the 
initial 50% to the current 90%. KIWASCO’s annual turnover is about Ksh 180 million. 
Of this, 10% goes to the municipality as a fee for lease of the assets and 5% is paid to the 
Water services Board61. Even with the high electricity bill and these expenditures, the 
Finance Manager62 explained that the company is making a profit – implying that 
KIWASCO is operating on commercial principles. However, according to the Municipal 
Engineer, Kisumu Municipal Council63, KIWASCO was exempted from paying divi-
dends and rates to the council until they start making profit. For that reason, the company 
owe the municipal council some money. On tariffs, the Finance Manager64 explained that 
every water service provider has a unique tariff structure, depending largely on the 
operating costs and specifically on whether the service provider is using gravity or a 
pumping scheme. A pumping scheme is much more expensive to run. The water tariff 
structure in Kisumu is progressive but with a minimum flat rate of Ksh 180 for up to 6 m3 
of water. 
 
Pro-poor programmes 
As part of its pro-poor programme, KIWASCO is implementing a pioneer ‘delegated 
management model’ in Nyalenda – a densely populated slum area in Kisumu. This is a 
model where KIWASCO sells water in bulk and at a subsidized tariff to a private 
operator in the community, who in turn manages its distribution and other aspects. The 
selected operator acts as an agent of KIWASCO in terms of connecting customers, 
operating the sub-network, collecting revenue and fixing leaks. It is not only a per-
formance-based contract but also a profit-making enterprise towards access to clean and 
affordable water. The model is intended to make water affordable to the poor, bring a 
sense of ‘ownership’ and thereby reduce some of the problems related to human inter-
ference, i.e. illegal connections and leakages (see also Box 2). 
 
Box 2: Expectations of a delegated management model 
• Increased access to safe and affordable water. 
• Reduced unaccounted-for-water through less illegal connections, less vandalism and less 
leakages. 
• Increased revenue collection for the company. 
Source: Morel (2006); Ombogo (2006). 
 
In this project, KIWASCO sells water to the operator at Ksh 25 per m3. Through water 
kiosks and the distribution system set up by KIWASCO, the operator sells the water to 
                                                 
61 KIWASCO is a water service provider that falls under the Lake Victoria South Water Services Board 
(LVSWSB). 
62 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
63 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
64 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
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consumers at Ksh 50 per m3, i.e. Ksh 1 per 20-litre container, cheaper than what the 
company charges other customers. According to the Finance Manager65, “this is a small 
KIWASCO in the community”. It is the intention of KIWASCO to extend this model to 
other low-income neighbourhoods. 
 
Even then, the Finance Manager66 is of the opinion that the informal settlements, with a 
population of about 83,000 people, can also be best served by standpipes. This view is 
shared by the Chief Technical Advisor of LVWATSAN-Kenya67, who advocates for 
expansion of infrastructure to the informal settlements. But according to the Team Leader 
of SANA68, taps are normally dry in most of the low-income neighbourhoods. For 
example, in Manyatta A residents obtain water largely from water vendors at a very high 
(unaffordable) price. The price of a 20-litre container of water ranges between Ksh 3 and 
Ksh 5, compared to water from the wells which costs Ksh 1. The wells are more often 
than not unprotected and therefore risk being contaminated with discharge from the pit 
latrines. The Chief Technical Advisor, LVWATSAN-Kenya concurs that Manyatta A has 
a number of unprotected shallow wells sharing the same water table with pit latrines, 
resulting in frequent cholera outbreaks in the area (see also Box 3). 
 
Box 3: Lakeside city thirsts for clean water 
In an open letter to Minister Charity Ngilu69, [a Kisumu resident] claims Kisumu is in the 
“intensive care unit” when it comes to access to water. “I stay in the town (…) and it is a mystery 
why there is no water yet we live next to Lake Victoria. The situation is so pathetic that I think 
only two per cent of residents have access to clean water. The rest make do with contaminated 
water,” he says, adding that only the wealthy seem to have an uninterrupted supply. [He] claims 
some residents have not had water flowing from their taps for the last three years, despite the 
commissioning of some donor-sponsored projects in the past. Is the minister aware, he asks, that 
Nyamasaria, Bandani, Kibos, Otonglo, Nyalenda, Nyawita, Migosi, Kondele, Tom Mboya, Jua 
Kali, Okore, Nubian, Arina, Ondiek and Argwings among other estates have not had water for a 
long time? “Waziri70, you have so many admirers in Kisumu, but you have to crack the whip so 
that the officers responsible for providing water do their job. These complaints have been going 
on for a long time and action needs to be taken now,” he says. 
Source: The East African Standard Online Edition, Tuesday 27 January 2007. 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
66 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
67 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
68 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
69 Hon. Charity Ngilu is the Minister for Water and Irrigation. 
70 Swahili word for Minister. 
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5.2.2  Sustainable Aid in Africa (SANA) International 
SANA started its operations as an NGO in 2001. It was previously a Dutch-Kenya 
bilateral programme (1982-2000) in rural water and sanitation in the then South Nyanza 
District of Nyanza Province. SANA deals with issues related to domestic water supply 
and targets the un-served urban and peri-urban informal settlements and the poor in 
general, besides dealing with environmental sanitation. Specifically, the focus of SANA 
is on: 
• Provision of water for domestic use. 
• Provision of sanitation facilities and environmental sanitation. 
• Water for agricultural production, i.e. drip irrigation and efficient use of water. 
• Credit for water through a revolving fund, i.e. providing loans to develop water infra-
structure.71 
• Water and sanitation for schools. 
• Networking and collaboration. 
 
SANA is currently running a ‘school-plus-community’ water intervention programme. 
SANA is particularly concerned with lack of water and sanitation facilities in many 
schools. According to the Team Leader72, “girls are the most affected without adequate 
sanitation facilities in schools – they may miss school for a couple of days during their 
menstrual periods simply because of fear. Furthermore, children spend most of their time 
during the week in school and should be provided with adequate water supply and 
sanitation facilities”.73 SANA provides water points in schools which can also be used by 
the community living around the school. In addition to improving the school’s sanitation 
facilities, SANA promotes environmental sanitation and hygiene through encouraging 
students to start health clubs. The first phase of the ‘school-plus-community’ programme 
targets 20 schools in the rural areas and 20 schools in the urban areas.74 Already, there are 
two related projects (funded by CORDAID) in Nawa and Wandiege Primary Schools. 
 
Within Kisumu municipality, SANA has three on-going water projects, namely: 
• Paga water supply (in a peri-urban area southwest of Kisumu) serving two sub-
locations. Water is pumped from Lake Victoria (4 km away) to raised tanks for dis-
tribution to the water supply kiosks. However, the challenge has been the receding 
lake levels and the quality of water. 
• The Obunga (slum) water project in collaboration with KIWASCO but which is not 
functional at present because of disconnection resulting from non-payment. 
• Manyatta B (slum) community water supply project. 
 
                                                 
71 Seven projects have so far benefited from this loan scheme. 
72 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
73 World Health Organization recommends one door (of a latrine) for every 25 girls and one door for every 
35 boys as adequate. 
74 The “school-plus-community” programme in urban schools will be supported by the Dutch NGO, 
CORDAID. 
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SANA’s completed programmes include (1) the water-for-schools – a Coca Cola project 
together with CARE Kenya; (2) the water-for-school-plus-community programme in 
Nawa and Wandiege; (3) Asengo water and Gita water springs project, despite the spring 
drying up and the problem of water quality; and (4) the protection of shallow wells in 
Bandani. Other NGOs – Africa Now, World Vision and CARE Kenya – are focusing on 
roof catchment tanks, provision of water, and provision of safe water storage, 
respectively. 
 
It is worth noting that SANA has led to the creation of a consortium bringing together 
three NGOs working towards integrated development. However, the Municipal Engineer 
of the municipality of Kisumu75 was very negative about the role of the about 200 NGOs 
active in Kisumu. He said that “their practical impact is negligible”. This opinion was 
later shared by the Human Resources and Administration Manager of KIWASCO76 that 
NGOs in Kisumu have “no sustainable effects”. 
5.2.3  Wandiege: A community water supply project 
The Wandiege Community Water Supply Project (Wandiege) started in 2002. The 
project, located in Manyatta B estate77, is wholly owned, operated and managed by the 
community. From a total budget of Ksh 3 million to start the project, CORDAID 
provided Ksh 2 million while the community was expected to raise the remaining Ksh 1 
million. Although it was a tall order for the poor community, they achieved to raise the 
amount through the ‘sale of shares’. To become a member, one had to ‘buy shares’ of 
Ksh 1,000. Those who could not afford to raise this amount of money ‘bought their 
shares’ through providing labour (i.e. digging trenches and laying the pipes). In addition, 
the community received Ksh 300,000 from the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) 
and additional Ksh 500,000 from Constituency Development Fund (CDF). 
 
Wandiege is in fact a water service provider registered by LVSWSB just like KIWASCO. 
They have their own independent management, network, operations and tariffs. Although 
aware of their existence, the Financial Manager of KIWASCO was categorical that “we 
are supposed to do business and we do not see them as a competitive company”. The 
project’s source of water is a 110 metres deep borehole which serves a radius of 5 km2. 
The water from the borehole is pumped into two tanks of 10,000 litres each before being 
distributed to the ‘consumers’. The project’s office, borehole and storage tanks are 
located on a primary school compound, for which the project does not have to pay. In 
return, the project has let the school use the water and their electricity connection without 
pay. 
 
                                                 
75 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
76 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
77 Manyatta B is a peri-urban low-income neighbourhood in Kisumu municipality. 
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Although it initially started with volunteer workers from the community, the project is 
now able to pay its revenue clerk and caretakers a ‘small’ monthly salary. This is because 
the project, first and foremost, operates on a non-profit basis. The revenue they get from 
selling water is largely used for operations and maintenance. The ‘profit’ they make at 
the end of the year is pumped back into community development. 
 
Photo 2: Wandiege water kiosk 
Photo: Dick Foeken 
 
The present water supply network serves 69 homes and 7 water kiosks in the area. The 
water kiosks are given to women and self-help groups to manage. At the kiosk, water is 
sold at Ksh 1 for a 20-litre jerrycan. The revenue clerk and caretakers are expected to 
collect the daily revenue from the kiosks and bring it to the project’s office in the school 
for recording and safe keeping. On the other hand, the connected homes have individual 
meters, which the line patrollers check and record the meter readings on a monthly basis. 
Those connected are expected to check their ‘bills’ at the project’s office and pay 
according to the amount of water they have consumed. The water meters for individual 
connections are installed immediately after the main pipe to reduce incidences of 
‘unaccounted-for-water’ through leaks and burst pipes. In that way, consumers take care 
of, and immediately report, any burst pipe and leak beyond the meter rather than incur the 
cost (of unused water) in their bill. 
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Besides providing water to the community, another important aspect in this project is 
capacity building, training and empowerment. The training and capacity building is done 
by SANA. Through SANA, some of the members and volunteers have been trained on 
the technical and management issues of the project. For example, caretakers have been 
trained in laying pipes, pump operations and detecting bursts from the mains. The 
management team have been trained on general and financial management issues while 
the community has been trained in health and hygiene. 
 
In relation to health and sanitation, CORDAID has funded 14 ECOSAN latrines in the 
area. Sand-platform (sand-plat) latrines are being encouraged and promoted because of 
the loose soil structure. Already 91 sand-plats have been constructed. According to 
SANA’s officer in charge of this sanitation project78, occurrence of waterborne diseases 
has drastically reduced since the implementation of this project (Wandiege and 
ECOSAN). Before the water supply project, people relied on River Nyamasaria without 
bothering to treat the water. In addition SANA has sensitised the community on good 
hygiene and sanitation practices and because of the introduction of ECOSAN and sand-
plat latrines, there is less open defecation. 
 
Though Wandiege is a success story as an independent community water supply project, 
it is not short of challenges. Some of the challenges the project is facing include: 
• Bursting of the water storage tanks, seemingly due to a manufacturer’s default. So far, 
two water tanks have been subjected to bursting. At the time of this interview79, the 
second burst water tank had not yet been replaced by the supplier. 
• Frequent interruptions of electricity supply interfere with the pumping schedule and 
steady flow of water to the consumers. Furthermore, the electricity bill has increased 
in the recent past. The project hopes to complement the use of electricity with solar 
energy, if the option is viable. 
• The school compound is relatively small for the project’s expansion. In addition, the 
project occasionally ‘interferes’ with the school activities, for example, when visitors 
come to the project site. It is also dangerous for the school children, for example, 
when a storage tank bursts, as has happened twice. 
• Lack of trust and goodwill from some members of the community who think that the 
officials are benefiting from the project. Also, some members in the community ex-
pect ‘free’ services and ‘quick’ benefits from the project – making it difficult for 
expansion and laying of pipes. 
• Acquiring land to expand the project. There is already a proposal to add two more 
water points (boreholes). 
• Lack of ‘enough’ storage tanks for a constant flow of water. 
• Occasional illegal connections and bursting of pipes. 
• The water is ‘a little bit saline’. 
                                                 
78 Interview, 14 October 2008. 
79 14 October 2008. 
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5.3  Homa Bay 
Homa Bay is the district headquarters of Homa Bay District located in the western part of 
Kenya on the shores of Lake Victoria, 105 km from Kisumu and 405 km from Nairobi. 
The town covers an area of 23 km2 of which 3 km2 falls within the central business 
district.80 With a population of about 90,000 people, Homa Bay is primarily an ad-
ministrative centre with small-scale trading as the dominant economic activity. Notably is 
the trade in fish, especially near the fish processing factory. Fish is brought to the town 
by fishing boats from elsewhere. The three low-income settlements in the municipality 
are Shauri Yako, Makongeni and Sophia. Water and sanitation services in the munici-
pality are provided by the South Nyanza Water and Sanitation Company (SNWASCO), 
while sewerage services are still under the Municipal Council of Homa Bay. Other 
alternative sources of water for the municipality residents include lake water, boreholes 
(where people pay for water), shallow wells and roof catchment. The UN-HABITAT’s 
LVWATSAN programme is actively involved in both short-term and long-term inter-
ventions in water and sanitation in the municipality. This is being done in collaboration 
with the Municipal Council of Homa Bay, SNWASCO and the Multi-Stakeholder Forum 
(MSF-Homa Bay). 
5.3.1  South Nyanza Water and Sanitation Company (SNWASCO) 
Organization and management 
SNWASCO started its operations in July 2006. Initially, water services in Homa Bay 
were under the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. All the staff in the company was in-
herited from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation but SNWASCO has hired the Managing 
Director, Commercial Director, Technical Manager, Administration and Personnel 
Manager and the Internal Auditor. Surprisingly, all the employees of the company are 
still being paid by the ministry and therefore answerable to their ‘employer’ rather than 
the company.81 This makes the work of the Managing Director quite difficult because he 
has to manage a workforce not directly answerable to him. SNWASCO operates in a 
cluster system comprising Homa Bay Water Supply (which serves the municipality), 
Mbita Water Supply, West Rachuonyo Water Supply, Oyugis Water Supply and Kendu 
Bay Water Supply. The company has 6 Board of Directors, i.e. The Managing Director, 
The Mayor of Homa Bay town and representatives of other shareholding county councils. 
All assets of the company belong to the Lake Victoria South Water Services Board 
(LVSWSB).82 The Managing Director cannot make any decisions regarding the assets, 
such as replacing defective equipment, without consulting with LVSWSB. The Secretary 
to MSF-Homa Bay83 attributes some of these challenges to the fact that “water reforms 
seem to have been implemented hurriedly to impress the donors”. 
                                                 
80 There are conflicting figures about the exact area of Homa Bay municipality. 
81 One gets the impression that SNWASCO may be operating at a loss or not making enough profit to be 
able to hire and pay its staff. 
82 SNWASCO is a water service provider that falls under LVSWSB. 
83 Interview, 16 October 2008. The MSF-Homa Bay is discussed below. 
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Coverage of water supply network 
SNWASCO provides only water services to Homa Bay municipality. Sewerage services 
are still under the Municipal Council of Homa Bay, although the company collects the 
sewerage charges on their behalf at a 5% fee. This is largely because SNWASCO and the 
municipal council are yet to sign the service provision agreement. There are about 3,000 
connections in the municipality, mainly concentrated in the town centre, hospital and 
prisons areas. SNWASCO produces about 3,000 m3 of water per day against an estimated 
demand of about 18,000 m3 per day. Through the LVWATSAN programme, another 
water intake point has been constructed and four new water pumps installed to increase 
SNWASCO’s production capacity and the town’s water supply. The company gets its 
water solely from Lake Victoria. 
 
Photo 3: The new water in-take point 
Photo: Dick Foeken 
 
Pumping of water from the intake point (near Shauri Yako) to the two treatment plants is 
done everyday at night for 8 hours. This is intended to cut down on the high electricity 
bill currently incurred by the company and also to counter the problem of low voltage of 
power from the main grid. MSF-Homa Bay is lobbying for a 12-hour pumping system. 
The ‘old’ treatment works constructed in 1956 has a capacity of about 900 m3 of water 
per day, while the ‘new’ treatment works constructed in 1987 has a capacity of about 
2,000 m3 per day. This is far below the municipality’s demand of water. 
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The Clerk of Works, LVWATSAN-Homa Bay84, describes the municipality’s water 
situation as “very acute” because only about 30% of the households have connections to 
the distribution network. Furthermore, water supply is very unreliable due to the frequent 
water rationing necessitated by the high cost of electricity needed to pump enough water 
from the intake point. While the town centre, the hospital and prisons receive water on a 
daily basis, other parts of town are subjected to water rationing based a schedule 
determined by SNWASCO. 
 
Unaccounted-for-water 
The proportion of unaccounted-for-water is still high (50-54%) despite dropping from 
65% since the company started its operations.85 The lack of leak detectors is a major 
contributing factor to the high level of unaccounted-for-water, besides the rampant illegal 
collections. The company has now started door-to-door impromptu checks for illegal 
connections in the municipality. 
 
Metering, billing and revenue 
A large number of consumers in the municipality are still paying for water on a flat rate 
basis because of lack of meters or non-functioning meters.86 For example, out of the 918 
connections on a flat rate tariff, 752 of them are because their meters “stopped working 
long ago”. Furthermore, according to the Secretary, MSF-Homa Bay87, the billing is very 
inefficient as most consumers do not receive their bills on time. To improve metering and 
billing, the LVWATSAN programme provided the company with 500 new meters to 
replace the ones that are not working.88 The priority areas for replacement of non-
functional meters are water kiosks, hotels, government departments and standpipes. Al-
though the revenue is still very low, it is gradually improving following the interventions 
from the LVWATSAN programme. 
 
Pro-poor programmes 
Although the piped water distribution network covers some parts of the low-income 
estates – Sophia, Shauri Yako and Makongeni – only a few individuals and water kiosks 
are connected. A large majority of the population rely on water kiosks. Even then, 
because of the on-going water rationing, these estates receive water only for one, two or 
three days in a week – a situation experienced even before the reforms. Already, the 
LVWATSAN programme has constructed two water kiosks in Shauri Yako estate to 
increase access to clean water in low-income areas. These two water kiosks have been 
                                                 
84 Interview, 15 October 2008. 
85 There were discrepancies in the figure given for unaccounted-for-water. In one of the interviews, the 
figure was as high as 85%. 
86 A flat rate tariff is where the consumer is charged a fixed monthly rate irrespective of the amount of 
water consumed – normally for non-metered customers. 
87 Interview, 16 October 2008. 
88 At the time of this interview (16 October 2008), not all the meters had been installed. 
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left to MSF-Homa Bay to determine which of their group members to run them. A 20-
litre container of water costs Ksh 2 at the LVWATSAN programme water kiosks after 
buying it from SNWASCO at Ksh 25 per m3. However, a tour of Shauri Yako revealed 
that the two water kiosks have not been operational since they were ‘officially opened’ 
(see Box 4). Also not operational yet completed, is the improved toilet in the same estate. 
 
 
Box 4: ‘The politics of water in Homa-Bay’89 
A water kiosk, a water point or a standpipe with running water is a lucrative business in this 
town. There are six water points (i.e. standpipes) licensed by the water company but privately-
run by well-connected individuals, including former and current councillors. Some corrupt 
officials of the water company collude with these individuals to create an artificial water 
shortage in the municipality by frequently closing the piped water distribution lines serving 
areas where the privately-run water points are located. On the other hand, the same water 
company officials conveniently leave the separated distribution lines to these water points 
open. Apparently, the separation of the distribution lines was not by default but by design from 
the period the municipal council was still in charge of water services. With the only source of 
water being the water points, these individuals are able to charge Ksh 10 for a 20-litre 
container – far much higher than what is recommended by the water company. With the 
construction of the LVWATSAN programme water kiosks, the individuals operating the 
privately-run water points thought that they would soon run out of business. This is because a 
20-litre container of water would cost Ksh 2 at the LVWATSAN programme water kiosks – far 
much cheaper than what they charge. On the day of the official opening of the LVWATSAN 
programme water kiosks, there was plenty of water. The next day, however, the (separate) 
distribution line supplying water to the LVWATSAN programme water kiosks was closed, 
while the one to the privately-run water points remained opened. Again, the separation of the 
distribution line was conveniently done during connection. In other words, the same (corrupt) 
officials from the water company protected the interests of the individuals running the water 
points. Since then, the LVWATSAN programme water kiosks have remained dry. However, 
the LVWATSAN programme (or UN-HABITAT) is not willing to be dragged into the local 
water politics. MSF-Homa Bay has taken over the matter and a solution is being sought 
through the Project Implementation Unit90 meetings and other channels. In short, the poor are 
yet to benefit from these water kiosks. In addition, the idea of pumping water for only 8 hours 
is also a scheme to create an artificial water shortage so that the individuals running the private 
water points would continue having a thriving business. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 As described by the Secretary, MSF-Homa Bay (Interview, 16 October 2008). 
90 This is the implementing arm of all the LVWATSAN Initiative projects. 
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Photo 4: A non-operational water kiosk 
Photo: Dick Foeken 
 
5.3.2  The Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative in  
 Homa Bay (LVWATSAN-Homa Bay) 
Working closely with the Municipal Council of Homa-Bay, SNWASCO and the Homa 
Bay Multi-Stakeholder Forum (MSF-Homa Bay), the LVWATSAN programme has 
initiated a number of short- and long-term water and sanitation interventions in the 
municipality.91 The short-term interventions intended for immediate impact include: 
• Installation of four new pumps at the water intake points and treatment plants to 
increase the volume of water supply in the municipality. 
• Rehabilitation of the water treatment works to increase efficiency and reduce 
wastage. 
• Construction of two water kiosks in Shauri Yako estate to increase access to clean 
water in low-income areas. 
• Supply of bulk and individual consumer meters to SNWASCO to improve their 
metering, billing and efficiency. Already the project has supplied 500 individual 
meters to SNWASCO. 
                                                 
91 Phase 1 of the programme, which is complete, focused on the short-term interventions while phase 2, 
which is yet to start, will focus on the long-term interventions. 
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• Supply of tools and equipments, including10 small tractors to the municipal council 
to improve efficiency in sanitation services, especially in solid waste management 
and refuse collection.92 This is complemented by the construction of strategic refuse 
collection and transfer points, promoting sorting of wastes and capacity building in all 
aspects related to the tools, equipments and tractors. 
• Construction of the so-called VIP (ventilated improved pit) latrines in selected 
schools, churches and individual plots within Makongeni, Sophia and Shauri Yako 
for demonstration purposes. There is one of such latrines in Makongeni, 8 in Shauri 
Yako and one in Sophia. 
• Capacity building in management, operation and maintenance. 
 
The long-term interventions include: 
• Expansion of the water treatment plants to handle an additional capacity of 2,000 m3 
of water per day. 
• Extending the piped water distribution network by another 20 to 30 km, especially in 
the low-income areas. 
• Extending the sewer system by another 5 km. 
 
The programme is also thinking of a biogas installation in Shauri Yako estate not only as 
an alternative source of energy, but also a way of reducing the reliance on electricity for 
pumping water from the intake point located near Shauri Yako. 
5.3.3  The Multi-Stakeholder Forum in Homa Bay (MSF-Homa Bay) 
The MSF-Homa Bay was started in 2004 when the UN-HABITAT started building its 
activities in the municipality. It is a pro-poor governance mechanism intended to include 
and involve the poor people and all stakeholders in decision making on matters con-
cerning them. It is a vehicle for a collective participatory approach to problem solving. 
When MSF-Homa Bay started, the first step was to identify ‘key stakeholders’. The key 
stakeholders were identified as (1) government ministries in charge of water and sanita-
tion, public health, local government, physical planning, lands, survey and provincial 
administration; (2) civil society, i.e. Environmental Watch Programme, ECOVIC (East 
African Community Organisation for the Management of Lake Victoria), other NGOs, 
CBOs and churches; and (3) women and youth groups. 
 
Whereas membership of the key stakeholders was initially restricted to 27 members, it is 
now open to any interested organisation and group as long as they meet the forum’s 
membership requirements. As much as the composition of the key stakeholders is 
supposed to be broad based, participation in the forum is left solely to the stakeholder’s 
interest as nobody is forced to become a member. The key stakeholders are divided into 
three committees to run the ‘technical’ affairs of the forum. These are the infrastructure 
                                                 
92 The 10 small tractors for refuse collection had not been delivered at the time of this interview (15 
October 2008). 
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committee, the communication and awareness committee and the capacity building 
committee. During the time of this interview93 each committee had 6 or 7 members who 
meet as need in their technical area arises. However, councillors94 do not sit in these 
technical committees. 
 
All deliberations at the committee level are brought to the ‘general assembly’ for further 
deliberation. The general assembly which is called when need arises brings together all 
‘members’ of the forum. All residents in Homa Bay municipality, including the coun-
cillors, are, by default, members of the forum and are welcome to attend the ‘informal 
open air’ general assembly to “freely and openly deliberate on matters affecting their 
lives and the municipality”. In the general assembly, anybody wishing to contribute is 
given a chance to do so regardless of status, gender and age. The ‘views’ expressed in the 
general assembly are incorporated in the concerned committee’s report before being 
forwarded to either the Project Implementation Unit or a full council meeting. To be 
focused in their deliberations, all meetings (key stakeholders meetings, technical 
committee meetings and the general assembly) have an agenda drawn by the forum’s 
Chairperson and Secretary in close consultation with the concerned technical committee. 
Even then, the Chairperson has the ultimate say in the agenda for the day. The current 
Chairperson of MSF-Homa Bay is the Mayor of Homa Bay while the Secretary is a 
member of the key stakeholders.95 
 
MSF-Homa Bay was initially viewed with suspicion, especially by the councillors who 
thought that the forum is an emerging force to usurp their power and responsibility in 
running municipality affairs. In fact the councillors strongly resisted the idea, terming it a 
parallel authority. After some lobbying and consensus building, it was decided that all the 
councillors become members of the forum and that the Mayor be the Chairperson. This 
has served to reduce political friction and opposition to the forum’s operations. The 
municipal council has even provided an office space in the town hall for the forum’s 
operations, including space for meetings. In addition, the council occasionally provides 
refreshments during the forum’s key stakeholders and technical committee meetings. 
 
To constantly engage its members, MSF-Homa Bay undertakes voluntary clean-up 
activities in the municipality every Tuesday. So far, at least one or more councillors have 
joined and participated in these clean-up activities. The Secretary to the forum noted that 
the turn-out to these activities is normally very good, reflecting the enthusiasm, active 
involvement and approval of Homa Bay residents in the forum’s activities. In fact, the 
residents are gradually identifying themselves with the forum’s decisions and projects. 
 
                                                 
93 16 October 2008. 
94 Councillors represent the electoral wards within the municipality and are elected through voting every 
five years. 
95 The Secretary is a practicing lawyer by profession and also the CEO of Environmental Watch 
Programme – an NGO based in Homa Bay. 
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While most of the forum’s proposals are normally approved at the full council meeting 
and implemented, some are modified or rejected. On the other hand, MSF-Homa Bay has 
in a few instances lobbied against some unpopular council decisions. For example, a 
proposal to locate 10 latrines in Shauri Yako, with one of them in a councillor’s com-
pound, was rejected by the people (through the forum) because “they had not been 
consulted by the council to determine where to locate the toilets”. In another example, a 
misunderstanding arose on the “ownership, management and use” of the 10 small tractors 
to be supplied for refuse collection by the LVWATSAN programme. However, a com-
promise was reached to have the municipal council own and maintain the tractors but 
allow members of the forum to fuel and use them whenever they needed one for their 
community clean-up and refuse collection activities. 
 
MSF-Homa Bay is now working towards integrating its ‘vision’ with that of the Muni-
cipal Council of Homa Bay. This is mainly because the forum is “increasingly playing an 
advisory role” to the municipal council. In addition, the provincial administration is using 
the forum’s network for a door-to-door campaign on environmental sanitation. However, 
despite the seemingly good working relationship between the forum and the municipal 
council, a proposal to (legally) institutionalize MSF-Homa Bay (through a council by-
law) has been strongly opposed by the councillors. Instead, the council in one of its 
council resolution recognises the existence, operations and activities of the forum within 
the municipality and as a “partner in development”. This implies that MSF-Homa Bay 
has some quasi legal status at the municipality level. It is now almost impossible to start a 
project in the municipality without involving the forum at all stages. In fact the forum is 
categorical that it shall oppose the funding and implementation of projects by any 
organisation or agency if the project has no positive impact to the residents. This is also a 
way to avoid duplication of interventions in the municipality. 
 
MSF-Homa Bay plans to sustain its operations and activities through a revolving fund. 
Members are currently contributing Ksh 1,000 per month to this fund. Whenever a 
member needs a loan, they can obtain it at a 5% interest within a loan repayment period 
of six months. In addition, the LVWATSAN programme is set to inject about US$ 
10,000 into the forum’s projects. According to the Technical Advisor of the 
LVWATSAN programme in Kenya96, the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is the 
technical implementing arm of all its activities. The PIU comprises a representative from 
the water company, a representative from the municipal council and central government 
representatives from line ministries. The Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer of MSF-
Homa-Bay are members of the PIU. 
 
 
                                                 
96 Interview, 13 October 2008. 
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5.4  Kisii 
Kisii town, located in the south-western part of Kenya, is the main urban and commercial 
centre in the larger Kisii highlands and the district headquarters of Kisii Central District. 
The municipality covers an area of 29 km2 with a population of about 83,000 people. 
However, the population that the town serves is much higher because many people work 
in town but live in the areas surrounding the municipality. Kisii is mainly an agricultural 
town reflecting the livelihood of its inhabitants. It has abundant rainfall that recharges the 
numerous springs in the region. The main low-income estates in the municipality are 
Nubia, some parts of Nyanchwa, Mwembe Tayari, Jogoo and Nyamataro. Gusii Water 
and Sanitation Company (GWASCO) is the provider of water and sanitation services in 
municipality while the Municipal Council of Kisii is in charge of solid waste disposal and 
drainage. Other alternative sources of water for Kisii residents are springs97, shallow 
wells, streams, boreholes, roof catchment and water vendors. The UN-HABITAT’s 
LVWATSAN programme is actively involved in short- and long-term interventions in 
water and sanitation in the municipality. This is being done in collaboration with the 
Municipal Council of Kisii, GWASCO and the Multi-Stakeholder Forum (MSF-Kisii). 
5.4.1  Gusii Water and Sanitation Company (GWASCO) 
Organization and management 
GWASCO started its operations in July 2006 after signing the service provision 
agreement with the Lake Victoria South Water Services Board (LVSWSB).98 It operates 
in a cluster system covering eight water supplies in the administrative districts of Gusii. It 
is a limited company owned by 11 local authorities drawn from the area of jurisdiction. 
Each local authority is a shareholder and the proportion of shares depends on the number 
of consumers connected to the piped water supply system. Kisii municipality with over 
half of the total number of consumers (or water connections) is the largest shareholder as 
well as being the largest local authority (see Box 5 for GWASCO’s vision and mission). 
 
Box 5: GWASCO: Vision and Mission 
Vision: “To be the global leader in water and sanitation provision.” Mission: “To efficiently 
provide safe, adequate, reliable, affordable and sustainable water, sanitation and allied services 
to our customers.” 
 
The company has a Board of Directors comprising 4 directors representing the local 
authorities, 5 who represent stakeholders, and the Managing Director. The stakeholders 
include professional bodies, institutions, the business community, and women represent-
atives. While GWASCO is responsible for water and sanitation services, solid waste and 
                                                 
97 One of the springs we visited – Riosongo – is a protected spring and has a continuous flow of water 
which is sometimes treated. 
98 GWASCO is a water service provider that falls under LVSWSB. 
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drainage is managed by the Municipal Council of Kisii. The municipality has a modern 
sewerage treatment plant which is currently underutilized because of the low sewer 
connections. The municipality has only about 1,200 sewer connections as most of the 
residents use on-site sewerage disposal systems, usually pit latrines. 
 
Coverage of water supply network 
Kisii municipality is served by Kisii water supply with over 6,000 registered connections. 
About 4,000 of these connections are concentrated in the town centre, Jogoo, Mwembe 
Tayari and Nyanchwa areas and have a reliable daily water supply. However, the high 
electricity bills and fluctuations in electricity supply have occasioned water rationing in 
the municipality. The main source of water is River Gucha. The new water supply and 
treatment works at Kegati was designed to produce 6,000 m3 of water per day but 
currently doing an average of 2,000 m3 per day. This is about five times lower than the 
estimated daily demand of about 9,500 m3. The old water supply and treatment works 
that also serves the municipality is a gravity system at Nyakomisaro drawing its water 
from the river with the same name. The area has been fenced to avoid encroachment on 
the river banks. To increase water supply, the LVWATSAN programme donated new 
water pumps to be used in Kegati. By the time of this interview99, these pumps were not 
fully operational due to the low voltage of power from the main grid. In other words, the 
new pumps need more voltage to run than the existing main grid is able to supply. 
Despite that, pumping of water is done on a continuous basis during the day and at night. 
 
Unaccounted-for-water 
When GWASCO started its operations, unaccounted-for-water was 70%. This has now 
reduced to the current average of 54% but still higher than the recommended range of 
25% to 30%. Unaccounted-for-water is attributed to illegal connections, (old) pipe bursts, 
and leaking pipes and storage tanks. The company has initiated block mapping to reduce 
incidences of illegal connections. Each block is assigned to a senior officer to monitor 
and create awareness to the consumers. In addition, the company is working closely with 
MSF-Kisii100 to identify illegal connections for the benefit of the residents. 
 
Metering, billing and revenue 
Kisii water supply is the main source of revenue to GWASCO. Even then, only half of 
the registered connections in the municipality are active, the majority of them metered 
and a few billed on a flat rate basis. Revenue collection is between Ksh 1.2 and 1.3 
million per month. The LVWATSAN programme has donated 500 meters to improve 
metering, billing and revenue. At the time of this interview101, only 200 meters had been 
installed. 
 
                                                 
99 17 October 2008. 
100 The MSF-Kisii is discussed below. 
101 17 October 2008. 
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Pro-poor programmes 
Through the intervention of the LVWATSAN programme, GWASCO has extended its 
provision of water to the low-income estates of the municipality. This has been achieved 
through the construction of (more) water kiosks in these areas. The programme has 
rehabilitated the main water supply line from Bobaracho storage tank to Jogoo estate 
which has facilitated increased individual connections and operation of the old water 
kiosk102. These kiosks sell water at Ksh 2 for a 20-litre container compared to water 
vendors who charge Ksh 10 for the same amount of water. 25% of the revenue from the 
water kiosks goes to the water company, while the rest remains with the operator. Nubia, 
the poor parts of Nyanchwa, Mwembe Tayari and Jogoo used to be covered by the main 
water supply network but they were all vandalised. 
5.4.2  The Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative in Kisii  
 (LVWATSAN-Kisii) 
Like in Homa Bay, the LVWATSAN programme in Kisii has initiated a number of short- 
and long-term interventions in the municipality. The programme started in 2004 and has 
been going on in collaboration with the Municipal Council of Kisii, GWASCO and MSF-
Kisii. The short-term interventions intended for immediate impact include: 
• Installation of new pumps at the Kegati treatment works to increase water production. 
• Rehabilitation and reviving of the main water supply line from Bobaracho storage 
tank to Jogoo estate. This line was not functioning for about 15 years but since its 
revival many people have been attracted to Jogoo. 
• Replacing old and leaking asbestos pipes (on the gravity system) with better ones. 
• Improving sanitation facilities in schools. 10 schools have already benefited from the 
construction of improved latrines and 5 of them facilitated (through an NGO) to start 
a roof catchment water harvesting project. 
• Capacity building for GWASCO staff and quarterly evaluation. This is being done by 
a successful water company from Uganda – National Water and Sewerage Corpora-
tion. 
• Construction of 10 water kiosks in Jogoo, Bobaracho, Gekomu, Milimani103, 
Mwembe Tayari, Daraja Mbili, Nubia, Nyamataro and Menyinkwa to increase access 
to clean water in low-income areas. However, only four water kiosks in Jogoo, 
Bobaracho, Mwembe Tayari and Milimani are operational. The main pipelines to the 
other water kiosks are yet to be repaired or replaced. These water kiosks are being 
operated by youth groups (Mwembe Tayari and Jogoo) and a women group 
(Bobaracho) who are members of MSF-Kisii. Whereas Bobaracho104 and Jogoo 
kiosks sell water at Ksh 2 for a 20-litre jerrycan, the same amount of water goes for 
                                                 
102 This water kiosk was working before the pipeline was vandalized. 
103 Milimani water kiosk was initially a standpipe. 
104 Bobaracho has invested in a water storage tank which is used during water shortages. 
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Ksh 3 in Mwembe Tayari. It is unfortunate that almost all these water kiosks were 
located on road reserves – making them vulnerable to demolitions.105 
• Supply of 500 meters to GWASCO to improve their metering, billing and efficiency. 
 
The long-term interventions include: 
• Replacing the old pipes in the network. 
• Extending the water supply pipeline network to cover a wider area. 
 
All these projects are implemented through the LVWATSAN’s Project Implementation 
Unit comprising a representative from GWASCO (for water and sanitation), a repre-
sentative from the municipal council (for solid waste and drainage) and central govern-
ment representatives in charge of public health, physical planning and environment. 
5.4.3  The Multi-Stakeholder Forum in Kisii (MSF-Kisii) 
The MSF-Kisii was started to encourage proactive solutions to problems facing Kisii 
residents. According to its Chairman106 “the forum is a new concept that is crucial 
because it brings all the stakeholders together”. It is a voice for all stakeholders as well as 
linking the water service provider, the local authority and the consumers. The stake-
holders include representatives from the business community, CBOs, youth groups, 
women groups and 2 councillors from the Municipal Council of Kisii. Unlike in Homa 
Bay where all the councillors are members, only two councillors have been co-opted as 
members in MSF-Kisii, including the Mayor as an ex-officio member. The forum’s office 
is located at the municipal council’s town hall. 
 
To ‘legalize’ their activities, MSF-Kisii was registered as a CBO with the Department of 
Social Services. It has become an entry point for addressing issues that affect the 
municipality and at the same time advocating for transparency and accountability in 
donor funded projects. The forum has an executive committee headed by an executive 
chairman. The executive committee works with three thematic working groups on: (1) 
building and infrastructure; (2) capacity building and mobilization; and (3) public aware-
ness and education. The forum reports to the LVWATSAN’s Project Implementation 
Unit. The forum drafted a six-month action plan (September 2007 to March 2008), 
including all kinds of activities107 and a budget but unfortunately little had been realized 
by the end of the year. Although funds were available to implement some of the activi-
ties, they were channelled through the municipal council. Worth mentioning here was the 
                                                 
105 There is a problem of land in Kisii. Two water kiosks located along the Kisii-Kilgoris Road have 
already been demolished to pave way for road expansion. As such, the LVWATSAN programme will, in 
future, provide only a standpipe with no permanent structure. 
106 The current Chairman is a practicing lawyer by profession. According to him, he is a “volunteer 
Chairman”, i.e. volunteering his services for Kisii residents (Interview, 17 October 2008). 
107 Some of these activities include: collaboration and networking; capacity building; income-generating 
activities; public awareness campaigns; and civic education. 
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plan for a series of public awareness campaigns on the activities of the forum before 
officially launching it. 
 
For ease of operations, the forum has divided the municipality into six blocks. Each block 
has a committee and a representative, who sits in the forum’s meetings. These repre-
sentatives are normally chairpersons of one of the CBOs in their blocks.108 At the block 
level, there are smaller working committees, each with a specific task. It is the duty of the 
block representative to represent the interest of his/her block members and also to be the 
forum’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground. They are in fact allowed to attend the PIU 
meetings. MSF-Kisii meetings are held on a monthly basis before the PIU meeting but if 
need arises, a meeting is convened at any time. The Chairman and Treasurer decide on 
the agenda based on issues raised by the members. Through these representatives, the 
forum makes sure that the municipal council has treated its water, the water is being 
pumped according to schedule and that the entire water supply system is working well.109 
 
The forum is creating awareness to residents not to vandalise the piped water distribution 
network and also not to engage in illegal connections. As a result, vandalism of water 
infrastructure has reduced and no one interferes with the LVWATSAN programme water 
kiosks. It encourages the members to participate in all stages of the projects that are 
implemented through them. For example, it involved the community in digging trenches 
for water pipes to be laid by the LVWATSAN programme. As indicated above, the water 
kiosks are run by women and youth groups who are members of the forum as an income-
generating activity. 
 
As a way of diversifying their activities, the forum has also mobilised CBOs to 
participate in solid waste management by collecting waste from the households to 
designated transfer points.110 This is besides the membership’s regular participation in 
clean-up campaigns at the municipal market. In addition, some of the public toilets in the 
municipality which have been rehabilitated by MSF-Kisii are being run by members of 
the forum.111 As part of capacity building, MSF-Kisii members were recently taken 
through (simple and low-cost) water risk assessment procedures to determine the quality 
of water at the source. Other plans towards capacity building include training (of mem-
bers) in zero grazing techniques and harnessing of biogas energy for cooking and 
lighting. Like in Homa Bay, the forum has started a trust fund as a way of sustaining 
itself “after UN-HABITAT”. 
 
                                                 
108 So far, 12 women groups and 8 youth groups are members of MSF-Kisii. 
109 During this interview (17 October 2008) with the Chairman of the forum, the Bobaracho Self-Help 
Group Chairperson came to report that one of the distribution tanks in Bobaracho was full and overflowing. 
110 The NGO, SANA, has been contracted by the UN-HABITAT to work with MSF-Kisii and micro-
finance the CBOs participating in solid waste management in the municipality. 
111 The forum also intends to rehabilitate public toilets which were constructed by the European Union in 
Nubia estate but have since been vandalised to a disgraceful state. 
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Photo 5: Bobaracho Market Self-Help Group water kiosk 
Photo: Dick Foeken 
 
Like in Homa Bay, the idea of forming a multi-stakeholder forum in Kisii was met with 
hostility from the councillors (politicians) who viewed it as a new centre of power. As 
such, the first few months of its inception were “not easy”. There was mistrust and 
sabotage from the councillors “in all possible ways”. For example, when officials of the 
forum wanted to visit the project sites, no vehicle was availed to them. Sometimes, they 
were deliberately not invited to Project Implementation Unit meetings. Even getting the 
office in the town hall came as a result of a long struggle. However, things have changed 
for the better as the council and the forum are working together and complementing each 
others’ efforts for the benefit of Kisii residents. It is not unusual, therefore, that the 
council provides space and refreshments to the members during meetings. Furthermore, 
the forum is currently negotiating with the municipal council to reduce the cost of 
connecting to the main sewer line from the current Ksh 50,000 for institutions and Ksh 
10,000 for individuals to “a reasonable and affordable figure”. 
5.5  Nakuru 
Nakuru town is located in the heart of the Great East African Rift Valley, 160 km 
northwest of Nairobi. The total area of the municipality is about 300 km2, some 60% of 
which is covered by the world-famous Lake Nakuru National Park. It is the fourth largest 
town in Kenya (after Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu) with a 1999 population of 239,000 
 60
people. It is the district headquarters of Nakuru District and the provincial headquarter of 
Rift Valley Province. A large proportion of the population is concentrated in the low-
income settlements of Kwa Rhonda, Kaptembwa, Mwariki, Lake View, Bondeni, Kivu-
mbini and Free Area. Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services Company (NAWASSCO) is 
the provider of water and sanitation services in the municipality while the Municipal 
Council of Nakuru is in charge of sewerage and drainage. Other alternative sources of 
water for Nakuru residents are private boreholes such as Nakuwell, rain water and water 
vendors. Nakuwell sells water to private tankers. 
5.5.1  Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services Company (NAWASSCO) 
Organization and management 
NAWASSCO was formed as a limited company in 2003 but started its operations in July 
2004. The Municipal Council of Nakuru is the sole shareholder. NAWASSCO is man-
dated to manage water services in Nakuru municipality after signing a quality service 
provision agreement with the Rift Valley Water Services Board (RVWSB)112. The five-
year agreement (2004-2009) is renewable. RVWSB is in charge of all the assets and 
infrastructure. Although the company inherited staff from the municipal council, they are 
now fully under NAWASSCO (see Box 6 for Nakuru’s long journey to NAWASSCO). 
 
The main source of water in Nakuru municipality is boreholes. The African Development 
Bank (ADB) has funded the drilling of 17 boreholes: 5 in Baharini, 3 at Nairobi Road and 
8 in Kabatini. A visit of Kabatini revealed that two of the boreholes were not operational 
and that rehabilitation of the place was visibly taking place. Under the ADB funded 
programme, staff houses are being rehabilitated and meters have been replaced to reduce 
unaccounted-for-water. However, for all the boreholes to operate at the same time there is 
need to increase the power voltage on the transformer serving the station. NAWASSCO 
is confident that by April 2009 a production capacity of 22,000 m3 of water per day is set 
to be achieved from this source. In addition, NAWASSCO will continue monitoring the 
aquifer on a monthly basis. 
 
Other sources of water are River Mereroni and the Turasha water supply in Gilgil.113 
Water from the boreholes is normally mixed with the water from Turasha to reduce the 
fluoride content.114 This is because some boreholes may have a higher fluoride content 
(of up to 19 mg/l) than the World Health Organization recommended level of 1.5 to 3 
mg/l. Water from River Mereroni is treated at the Mereroni treatment works before 
flowing on gravity to the main distribution lines. This source of water is categorized as 
for domestic and is charged on a flat rate basis for the consumers it serves. These sources 
of water produce about 35,000 m3 per day, slightly increasing from the initial 30,000 m3 
                                                 
112 NAWASSCO is a water service provider that falls under RVWSB. 
113 Turasha water supply is a gravity system. 
114 This is done at the Milimani treatment works, which during our visit was under rehabilitation and 
expansion. 
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per day. NAWASSCO is yet to achieve its targeted daily production capacity of 40,000 
m3, even though the demand is 70,000 m3 per day. The production is below optimal, 
partly because the voltages in the nearby transformer are yet to be increased. 
 
Box 6: Nakuru’s long journey to NAWASSCO 
Until the year 2000, the provision of water was under the Municipal Council of Nakuru. In the 
same year, the Nakuru Quality Water and Sanitation Services (NAQWASS) was formed as an 
autonomous company in an attempt to privatise water services in the municipality. It operated 
for five months before it was dissolved after personal intervention from the former President 
Moi and its operations handed over to the then Ministry of Water. When NAQWASS took over 
full responsibility for the Nakuru water services, it was confronted with a high rate of 
unaccounted-for-water on the one hand and huge liabilities on the other.115 Moreover, because of 
drought at that time the company had to buy additional water from the National Water 
Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC), for which it was charged Ksh 15 per m3 by 
the Ministry while it sold the water to consumers for Ksh 10 – a highly unsustainable situation. 
Another reason for NAQWASS’s failure was political. Sitting councillors had tried to get as much 
influence in the company as possible but could not accomplish what they were aiming for. Soon 
afterwards, a local newspaper reported that unknown people had been inserting blocks of wood 
into the main pipelines to bring the new company to its knees. But NAQWASS also moved 
quickly by disconnecting illegal and non-paying consumers, including local politicians and sitting 
as well as former councillors (most of whom were known to have illegal connections). A powerful 
group of opponents of commercialisation gathered and called upon the Kenya Power and 
Lighting Company to disconnect the council’s boreholes (officially because of the huge 
amount of unpaid electricity bills), which happened the same day (a Friday). The next day 
(Saturday), both power and water were reconnected again because President Moi was about to 
visit the town on Sunday. The people complained to the president about the water shortages, 
which induced him to call his Ministers for Local Government and for Water Resources. The 
result was that the Minister for Water Resources discontinued NAQWASS’s license, after 
which the ministry took over. The Ministry of Water turned out to be no better than NAQWASS 
as it could not even meet its operational costs. In June 2004, (donor) pressure to comply with 
the Water Act (2002) saw the formation of NAWASSCO. Under NAWASSCO, a new 
Managing Director, a Technical Manager and a Commercial Manager were included in the 
organizational structure. 
Source: Based on Mwangi (2002: 192-199) and Meijer (2005: 41-42). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Ksh 105 million to the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation and Ksh 60 million to the 
Kenya Power and Lighting Company. 
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Coverage of water supply network 
NAWASSCO’s water supply network covers about 65% of the municipality (i.e. an area 
of about 110 km2).116 The areas yet to be covered include the eastern part of the 
municipality (i.e. Pipeline area and the area behind Stem Hotel) – previously not 
inhabited. Most of the low-income neighbourhoods are not connected to the water supply 
system. The worst affected areas are Kiti, Kiratina, Free Area, Mwariki, Kaptembwo and 
Kwa Rhonda estates, which have no water connection systems (Sunday Standard, 
October 19, 2008). The existing sewerage system covers only the central business district 
and some parts of the industrial area. The municipality will continue to largely utilize 
septic tanks and pit latrines (in low-income areas) because interventions in this sector are 
not foreseen in the near future. 
 
Unaccounted-for-water 
Unaccounted-for-water has reduced from 80% to the current average of 43%. 
NAWASSCO has been able to achieve this reduction by making use of the new meters 
and a leak detector donated by the ADB programme. The unaccounted-for-water is attri-
buted to illegal water consumption and connections, non-metered connections, shortage 
of meters, defective meters, leakage of long service lines, and wastage at the council 
houses with communal water points. 
 
Metering, billing and revenue 
With a total of 20,000 active metered connections, metering has improved to 88%. In 
2008 alone, 12,000 meters were connected. However, areas with a higher likelihood of 
the meters being stolen are still billed on a flat rate basis of Ksh 200 per month. Whereas 
NAWASSCO is yet to start making profit, it is able to meet its operation and main-
tenance costs. And although the revenue may be low, it has improved from a monthly 
average of Ksh 5 million in the 1980s to the present Ksh 27 million with the same tariffs. 
This is despite the fact that electricity and other operation and maintenance costs have 
gone high. 
 
Pro-poor programmes 
NAWASSCO has constructed 7 water kiosks to serve the low-income estates of the 
municipality. Four of these kiosks are located in Rhonda and Kaptembwa but only 3 are 
operational. These water kiosks are managed by a CBO known as NAROKA. The kiosks 
are seemingly busy on the days of water rationing in the area. Until very recently the area 
received water only on Tuesdays and Fridays and only for half an hour per day. With the 
increasing production capacity of NAWASSCO, the situation has improved, such that 
water is now available 3 days a week (also on Wednesdays) and for 4 hours per day. 
During the rationing days and when residents with individual connections run out of 
water in their houses, they normally turn to these water kiosks. This is because the kiosks 
                                                 
116 It is estimated that only 18,000 households have piped water in Nakuru (Sunday Standard, October 19, 
2008). Nakuru has about 68,000 households. 
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are connected to a separate pipe that has a continuous flow of water. This implies that 
with a further increase in production capacity to its projected level of 45,000 m3 per day 
there will not be much business left for the water kiosks. NAWASSCO sells water to 
these kiosks at Ksh 5 per 1,000 litres of water and they retail the water at between Ksh 2 
and Ksh 5 for a 20-litre container. Residents with individual connections pay a monthly 
flat rate tariff of Ksh 200. One of the water kiosks is located in a market place with a 
public toilet constructed through public-private partnership efforts. The toilet is operated 
by the Nakuru Environmental Consortium (NEC). One needs Ksh 3 to use the toilet and 
Ksh 10 for a shower (bathroom facilities are also available). 
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6  Emerging impact and challenges of water  
 reforms and interventions in urban Kenya 
 
This section is a synthesis of the emerging impact and challenges of water reforms and 
interventions in urban Kenya based on the preliminary tour of the five towns (Eldoret, 
Kisumu, Homa Bay, Kisii and Nakuru) presented in the previous section. Examples from 
other sources and towns are illustrated in Box 7 to 12. As indicated before, most of the 
information comes from only a few respondents in each town, hence we were not able to 
always cross-check some of the data. It is no doubt that the water sector reform has 
reported tremendous improvements. As indicated in Section 3, water sector reforms in 
Kenya are intended to address the weaknesses in policy, regulation and service provision 
characteristic in the previous Water Act Cap 327. The expected outcomes of the water 
sector reforms are summarized in Table 6. However, it is not the intention of this section 
to analyse in how far these expected outcomes have been achieved. 
 
Table 6: Expected outcomes of the water sector reforms 
Policy formulation • Improved co-ordination in the water sector 
• Clear policy accountability 
• Focused attention to water resources management 
Regulation • Clear regulatory framework 
• Performance in monitoring and evaluation 
• Improved performance of water-undertakers 
Service provision • Improved management of water resources (quality and quantity) 
• Ability to attract and retain skilled manpower 
• Efficient provision of services leading to self sustainability 
• Increased coverage 
• Ability to attract investments 
• Improved infrastructure 
Source: Kenya (2006b) 
6.1  Emerging impact 
Minimal network extension with efforts towards rehabilitation and water kiosks 
All the five water companies operate within their municipality boundaries, which are of 
different sizes. The intensity of coverage in the municipality is still based on the existing 
water supply network inherited from the local authorities, the National Water Conserva-
tion and Pipeline Corporation and/or the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. As such, it is 
common to find that the central business districts and the high-income neighbourhoods 
(popularly known as milimani’s) are better connected than, for example, other parts of the 
city. Generally, none of the towns is yet to achieve maximum coverage. While Eldoret 
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and Nakuru boasts of 60% of the municipality being covered, less than half of Kisumu 
(40%) and Homa Bay (30%) municipality have access to piped water. However, the low-
income estates are more-often-than-not poorly connected or not connected at all. In short, 
service coverage is generally below target and expansion of the existing infrastructure is 
still minimal. Whereas there is insignificant network extension, i.e. in terms of new 
pipelines, efforts are being targeted to rehabilitating the existing network by replacing the 
old pipes. Although it is not clear to what extent, Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company, 
Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company and Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services 
Company, indicated that they have increased their network coverage by adding new 
pipelines. In Langas, one of the largest informal settlements in Eldoret, the need for 
household connections has increased to the extent that some of the existing water kiosks 
have been rendered functionally redundant. This is because the situation of water supply 
in the low-income estates is largely addressed through the provision of water kiosks. This 
is what is happening in Homa Bay and Kisii where water kiosks are being constructed to 
supply water to the poor neighbourhoods as a short-term intervention. 
 
Significant reduction in unaccounted-for-water 
Unaccounted-for-water is the difference between the quantity of water supplied to the 
network and the metered quantity of water used (and paid for) by the customers. To a 
large extent, the level of unaccounted-for-water is an indicator of how well a utility is 
managed. A reduction in unaccounted-for-water means improved revenue and saving the 
scarce water resources. Reduction of unaccounted-for-water within the distribution sys-
tem, efficient irrigation methods, recycling and re-use of water, and rainwater harvesting, 
including roof catchment for domestic purposes are some of the water conservation and 
demand management strategies that can be used in urban areas. It is no doubt that the 
water companies inherited high unaccounted-for-water at their inception, all above 
70%.117 In an effort to meet their performance targets, the water companies in the five 
towns have reduced their unaccounted-for-water to 62% in Kisumu, 54% in Kisii, 52% in 
Homa Bay, 43% in Nakuru, and 35% in Eldoret. Except for Eldoret and Nakuru, the 
other towns are still far from the recommended proportion of 25%. However, given the 
enormous challenges the water companies are facing as they implement the sector 
reforms, this reduction is indeed significant. Nakuru and Eldoret are doing comparatively 
better because they started water sector reforms much earlier. Specifically, they were 
among the three towns selected (together with Nyeri) to pioneer commercialisation of 
water supply through water and sanitation companies in Kenya. 
 
The high unaccounted-for-water and its continued persistence are attributed to physical 
(or technical) losses and administrative (or commercial) losses. Physical losses occur 
largely through leakage brought about by the ageing pipes and storage tanks. Admini-
strative losses result from illegal connections; lack of leak detectors; defective and non-
                                                 
117 Nakuru (80%), Kisumu and Homa Bay (75%) and Kisii (70%). For Homa Bay, we have used the 
average of the two conflicting figures which were given. 
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functional meters; flat rate tariff due to lack of meters; inefficient, incorrect and false 
meter readings and billings; and wastage of water at communal water points as is the case 
in Nakuru’s municipal council housing estates. The water companies have been able to 
address the high unaccounted-for-water in various ways. For example, creation of a 
department in charge of supervision; engaging private investigators and giving incentives 
to whistle blowers; quick response and repair to reported cases of leakages (in Kisumu); 
door-to-door impromptu checks for illegal connection (in Homa Bay); block mapping 
and awareness campaigns (in Kisii); and making use of new meters and leak detectors (in 
Nakuru). 
 
Box 7: Status of water services in Kisumu in 2003 before the reforms 
• Water production was 15,000 m3 a day against a water demand of 48,000 m3 (In 2006 the 
production had increased to about 20,000 m3 per day). 
• High levels of unaccounted-for-water averaging 70% (In 2006 the unaccounted-for-water had 
reduced to 60%). 
• Low levels of revenue – Ksh 10 million to 13 million per month – and low collection 
efficiency of about 60% (In 2006 the revenue had increased to 15 million per month). 
• Old infrastructure prone to frequent breakdowns, unplanned maintenance and broken sewer 
treatment plants. 
• Unreliable water supply and lack of customer focus. 
• No attention to the informal settlements thereby creating room for small scale independent 
service providers. 
• Unskilled and low remunerated staff with low morale. 
Source: Ombogo (2006). 
 
Towards improved metering, billing and revenue 
Although all the water companies alluded to the fact that metering, billing and revenue 
had improved, it is not possible at this stage to analyse by what proportion. However, 
there are indications that the companies are in the process of improving their metering, 
billing and revenue – albeit gradually. In Eldoret, 70% of the total connections pay their 
bills while in Kisii, half of the registered connections in the municipality are active. 
Kisumu’s metering ratio is 100% with a high revenue collection efficiency of 90% 
(increasing from 50%). In Nakuru, metering has improved to 88% and in 2008 alone 
12,000 meters were installed and connected to consumers. To improve metering, billing 
and revenue, the Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation (LVWATSAN) Initiative in 
Homa Bay and Kisii has provided the water companies with new meters. However, the 
installation of these meters is still in progress. 
 
Addressing the plight of low-income neighbourhoods through pro-poor programmes 
Despite the lack of a clear policy on pro-poor programmes, the water companies in the 
five towns recognise the need and importance of supplying water and sanitation services 
to the low-income neighbourhoods – where the large majority of the residents in these 
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towns live. While Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company may be ahead in their pro-poor 
focus, other towns have also initiated a number of pro-poor programmes. Notable among 
them is the continued provision of water kiosks or standpipes in the low-income 
settlements. These water kiosks are supposed to serve a number of people in the neigh-
bourhood as well as supplying safe and affordable water. The ‘delegated management 
model’ being pioneered in Nyalenda – a densely populated slum area in Kisumu – is 
another example. The project is intended to increase access to safe and affordable water 
to the urban poor. A similar project in Kisumu’s peri-urban low-income area but owned, 
operated and managed by the community is the Wandiege Community Water Supply 
Project. Eldoret has long-term plans to extend piped water supply to some of its low-
income neighbourhoods while at the same time continuing to supply water through water 
kiosk. Despite the water kiosks, residents are still relying on other highly priced and poor 
quality sources of water, i.e. water vendors, wells, springs, etc. 
 
 
    Photo 6: Protected spring in Kisii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Photo: Dick Foeken 
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Attraction of donor funding and interventions 
Water Services Boards are now able to attract and secure funding for rehabilitation and 
expansion of water and sanitation services. For example, the French government is active 
in Kisumu, UN-HABITAT in Homa Bay and Kisii, and African Development Bank in 
Nakuru. Some of these interventions, for example the LVWATSAN programme, have 
also brought new concepts in water governance. The multi-stakeholder forums in Homa 
Bay and Kisii are good examples of how various stakeholders, including the urban poor 
and women, are involved in water governance. However, it is not clear whether “water 
reforms seem to have been implemented hurriedly to impress the donors” as one of the 
respondents said or whether it was meant to attract donor funding and interventions. 
 
Providing an opportunity for other water service providers 
The Water Act 2002 allows for other Water Service Providers as long as they have been 
registered and given permit to operate by the Water Services Board. An example in these 
towns is Wandiege Community Water Supply Project in Kisumu. As said before, this 
water supply project, running along the same principles as Kisumu Water and Sewerage 
Company but on a much smaller scale, is wholly owned, operated and managed by the 
community. It supplies safe and affordable water to the people living around its water 
supply – a borehole. 
 
Box 8: The ‘reformed’ ELDOWAS 
Wambua (2004) revealed that under Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company (ELDOWAS), water 
performance has increased considerably. For instance, water losses have been reduced sub-
stantially through repairs and maintenance, illegal connectors are being prosecuted, and there has 
been no more water rationing since the company came into being. He lists the following as the 
key successes of ELDOWAS (ibid: 14): 
• There are fewer consumer complaints compared to the past when the municipal council was 
in charge of service provision. 
• Efficiency in revenue collection has gone up from 60% to 85%, against a target of collecting 
90% of total revenue due. 
• There is greater recognition of consumers as stakeholders evident from the establishment of 
complaints and customer service offices under its commercial and finance division. 
• Its tariff structure has differentiated between the poor and the rich. The poor pay Ksh 10 per m3 
of water. Water kiosks have also been opened in the low-income areas of Langas, Kipkaren, 
Kamukunji and Huruma. In these high-density, low-income areas 20 litres of water goes for 50 
cents. On the other hand, rich clients like the Rift Valley Bottlers (Coca-Cola subsidiary) pay 
Ksh 54 per cubic meter of water. 
According to Wambua (2004: 14), since its creation, ELDOWAS has substantial control over its 
finances “meaning that less of it can be diverted to non-water uses but instead be re-invested in 
improving service provision” Moreover, dividends to the shareholders – i.e. the Municipal 
Council – “strictly conform to the financial regulations of the company” (ibid). 
Source: Wambua (2004). 
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6.2  Emerging challenges 
Public or private companies? 
It is not clear whether the water companies are private or public limited companies. 
Whereas under the Companies Act, water and sanitation companies are registered as 
private, limited liability companies, they are 100% publicly owned by the local autho-
rities and are managing public assets to give an essential public service. Moreover, the 
companies are run by Boards of Directors representing the various stakeholders involved. 
However, it is difficult for stakeholders in the Water Services Boards and Water Service 
Providers to hold their Directors and top managers accountable as they are not share-
holders strictly speaking. 
 
Managing with old and dilapidated infrastructure 
The water and sanitation companies have inherited old, dilapidated and in some cases 
obsolete infrastructure from the local authorities, the National Water Conservation and 
Pipeline Corporation and/or the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. The existing water 
supply networks (i.e. piping) have long passed their economic life which increases the 
unaccounted-for-water through frequent bursts and leakages. For example, some of the 
pipes in Eldoret date back to the 1920s. Furthermore, the water supply networks are 
serving more people than they were initially designed for. So far, rehabilitation of the 
existing infrastructure is yet to be fully achieved. 
 
Old staff in a new outfit 
All the water companies have inherited employees previously employed in the Depart-
ment of Water and Sewerage of their respective local authorities or like in Homa Bay 
from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Only the directors and managers have so far 
been hired competitively. Besides having a cost implication this action brings into 
question the kind of employees the company has been forced to inherit. These employees, 
although in a new outfit, are likely to be slow or not ready to adapt to the reforms. For 
example, some employees have carried to the companies their previous corrupt practices 
and inefficiencies – denting the corporate image of the companies. The situation in Homa 
Bay is even more complicated. All the employees of South Nyanza Water and Sanitation 
Company are still being paid by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and therefore ans-
werable to their ‘employer’ rather than to the company. This makes the work of the 
Managing Director quite difficult because he has to manage a workforce not directly 
answerable to him. 
 
Inadequate capacity to manage the increasing demand for water 
The populations in these municipalities have increased and will continue to do so. A 
major challenge to the water companies will be to provide enough water, in quantity and 
quality, to the increasing population. Presently, none of the companies is yet to meet the 
daily water demand of their respective municipalities. Apart from Nakuru Water and 
Sanitation Services Company which has so far met at least half of the residents’ estimated 
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demand for water (i.e. a supply of 35,000 m3 per day versus a daily demand of 70,000 
m3), the situation in other towns is not very promising. That is, 18,000 m3 versus 45,000 
m3 for Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (Kisumu); 3,000 m3 versus 18,000 m3 for 
South Nyanza Water and Sanitation Company (Homa Bay); and 2,000 m3 versus 9,500 
m3 for Gusii Water and Sanitation Company (Kisii). This supply-demand shortfall has 
resulted in frequent water shortages and the now familiar water rationing. In an effort to 
increase the production of water, the water companies have embarked on rehabilitating 
their water pumping stations and (old) distribution networks; constructing new intake 
pumping stations; installing new water pumps; and increasing the pumping hours. Most 
of these are being accomplished through donor support or donor-funded projects, i.e. the 
French government for Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company, the LVWATSAN pro-
gramme for Homa Bay and Kisii, and the African Development Bank (ADB) in Nakuru. 
Through the ADB project, Nakuru Water and Sanitation Services Company is now able 
to supply water for 10 hours a day unlike the 6 hours it used to do. With the completion 
of the ADB-funded project, supply is projected to increase to 16 to 18 hours a day. 
 
Limited resources and high costs of operation and maintenance 
As much as the water companies are supposed to run as commercial enterprises, they are 
incurring very high operation and maintenance costs, compared to the revenue they are 
collecting. This brings into question the economic viability of the companies. In addition, 
limited resources affect the achievement of the well-written and ambitious strategic plans, 
business plans, performance contracts and benchmarks, which have come to be syno-
nymous with the water companies. Sometimes the companies are not able to achieve 
them at all. 
 
Box 9: KIWASCO: Strategic plan 2007-2012 
In its strategic plan of 2007-2012, Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company intends to: 
• Increase the water supply coverage to 50% (in terms of connections). 
• Increase the quantity and quality of potable water delivered to the distribution system to 
60,000 m3 per day at an annual growth rate of 6%. 
• Increase the served population to over 250,000 people. 
• Reduce the unaccounted-for-water to 35%. 
• Increase the household coverage on sewerage services to about 11,000. 
• Mitigate risk and ensure environmental protection. 
Source: KIWASCO (2007). 
 
The recent increase in electricity tariffs in the country are a further burden to the water 
companies who rely largely and sometimes wholly on electricity to pump water not only 
from the treatment plants to the consumers but also from the water intake points to the 
treatment plants. A pumping scheme is much more expensive to run than a gravity 
scheme. In Kisumu, for example, the electricity cost of pumping water from the lake to 
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the treatment plant is “very high”. The implication has been a reduction in the hours of 
pumping water to consumers, unreliability of supply, and rationing. 
 
Box 10: Council raises cost of water 
Residents of Eldoret will from this month [January 2009] start paying more for water (…). The 
new charges will be reflected in the January water bills (…) according to the managing director of 
the Eldoret Water and Sanitation Company, Mr. Reuben Tuwei. Mr. Tuwei told the Nation (…) 
that they were implementing the gazette notice of December 15, last year, from Lake Victoria 
North Services Board, which ordered the increment. In the notice the chief executive officer, Mr. 
Diru Magomere, ordered that the increment should take effect this year. Other water services 
affected are Nzoia, Amatsi of Kakamega and Kapsabet. According to the notice, individual 
consumers, who don’t have a meter installed, will pay a standing fee of Sh500. Reconnection fee 
has been increased from Sh300 to Sh500. The consumers have been paying Sh150 for up to 10 
cubic meters of water consumed, but this has gone up to Sh250. The board cited rising costs of 
chemicals, electricity, fuel, lubricants and maintenance materials for the rise in the tariffs. 
Source: The Nation Online 13 January 2009. 
 
 
Box 11: Outrage as firm increases water tariffs 
Outrage has greeted an increase in water tariffs by the Eldoret Water and Sewerage [sic] 
Company (Eldowas). Residents protested the move, which is aimed at harmonising tariffs under 
the Lake Victoria North Water Services Board (…) But Eldoret residents complained that the 
move was unrealistic. “Water flows by gravity from the Chebara Dam in Marakwet to Eldoret. 
The company does not spend much on pumping,” said [a] former councillor (…). “If other 
companies are incurring costs in terms of fuel and electricity to draw water from their sources, 
that is not the case in Eldoret,” said (…) a resident. Addressing the Press in Eldoret, consumer 
representatives announced they would hold protests (…) over the matter. 
Source: The Standard Online 13 January 2009. 
 
Local political interference 
In its strategic plan (2007-2012), Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company points “local 
political interference” as one of the risks towards good governance, financial resource 
mobilization, promotion of efficient utilization of resources and effective communication 
to stakeholders and customers (KIWASCO 2007). It can be argued that political 
interference is bound to occur given the fact that the water companies are wholly owned 
by the local authorities which are by their very nature political. Politicians will always 
have a tendency of interfering with proposed water projects and appointment of Board of 
Directors. 
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Box 12: Mombasa facing a water crisis 
Mombasa residents are now calling on the government to take over the management of water 
supply services to save the town from perennial water shortages. The residents said the Mombasa 
Water and Sewerage Company (Mowasco) should be disbanded for incompetence and 
mismanagement. "The situation is no longer bearable and the government should act immediately 
to avert a major outbreak of water-borne diseases", said businessman (…). Although water 
shortage in Mombasa is a common problem, the town and its environs have for the last one week 
experienced one of its worse water shortages forcing the residents to resort to untreated water 
from boreholes. "We thought the reforms in the water sector will bring positive changes in the 
water management but the situation has become a nightmare," said a restaurant owner (…). While 
the residents are crying over dry taps, water vendors are having a booming business where a 
jerrican of 20 litres is being sold at Sh40 and those staying in flats are paying more. A senior 
official at the Coast Water Services Board who talked to KNA on condition of anonymity blamed 
Mowasco for failing in its duties. The official said while the current water shortage was as a result 
of the breakdown of the only water pump at Baricho and the busting of the main pipe at Jomvu, 
the company stands accused of incompetence. The company has also been accused of failing to 
curb numerous illegal water connections in the town. "We at the board are very concerned and we 
have initiated measures aimed at improving water supply in Mombasa and other parts of Coast 
Province," he said. A reliable source at the Coast Water Services Board told KNA that the 
Managing Director of Mowasco (…) will soon be replaced as part of the process to put in place a 
new management team. The problems at the water company have been aggravated by the absence 
of a board of directors over the last three years owing to political differences between the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation and councilors at the Mombasa Municipal Council. Plans to 
launch the board two months ago aborted when [Minister for Water and Irrigation] called off the 
ceremony after a group of councilors and members of civil society complained over its 
composition. 
Source: The Kenya Weekly Post Posted on Wednesday October 29, 2008 
(See www.kenyaweeklypost.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7, accessed on 16 
February 2009). 
 
Inherited debts, liabilities and too many fees to be paid 
The water companies are paying too many fees – putting more pressure to their already 
constrained operation and maintenance costs. 10% of their total revenue goes to the 
municipality as a fee for lease of assets, 5% is paid to the Water Services Board, and 
another 1% is paid to the Water Services Regulatory Board. In addition, the water 
company is expected to pay 5 cents per every m3 of water to the Water Resources 
Management Authority. For a period of time the Municipal Council of Kisumu exempted 
Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company from paying “dividends and rates” to the council 
until “they start making profit”. Furthermore, the companies claim to have inherited debts 
and other liabilities from the previous service providers, which they continue to repay or 
shoulder to-date. 
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Extension of water services to the low-income neighbourhoods 
Poor planning has made it difficult for municipalities to put up a water infrastructure, 
especially in the mushrooming informal settlements. Their illegal status – at least 
according to the municipal authorities – has hindered the expansion of municipal services 
to serve them. The LVWATSAN programme in Homa Bay is tackling this problem by 
combining its water and sanitation interventions with town planning. Increasing access of 
water to the urban poor has also been hampered by the perception that the poor do not 
have the capacity to pay, yet they are paying far much more to get water from water 
vendors and other sources. 
 
Photo 7: Persistent water problems in a low-income neighbourhood in Kakamega 
Photo: Sam Owuor 
 
Lack of autonomy to do major investments 
Since the companies do not own the assets, they are only allowed to do minor invest-
ments. Water Services Boards who own and manage the assets are the ones responsible 
for investment. For any new investment, the Water Service Providers have to get 
approval (through a sector investment plan) from the Water Services Boards, implying 
more bureaucracies that it was intended to reduce. 
 
Inevitable flat rate tariffs 
Flat rate tariffs, especially in Homa Bay and Kisii, will continue to persist as long as the 
problem of lack of meters and malfunctioning meters is not addressed. For example, over 
three-quarters of the connections are on a flat rate tariff because most of the meters 
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“stopped working long time ago”, according to one of the respondents. In Kisii, flat rate 
tariff is being used in areas where the likelihood of the meters being stolen is high as 
meters are very expensive to replace now and then. 
 
Persistent illegal connections 
Despite the efforts towards controlling, reducing and stopping this unsustainable habit 
from the consumers, all the water companies were concerned about the persistence of 
illegal connections, not only in low income areas as one would expect, but also in other 
parts of the city. In Kisumu, for example, there are cases of illegal connections even in 
schools. 
 
Other challenges 
Other challenges include: 
• The receding lake levels, especially for Kisumu and Homa Bay which rely on Lake 
Victoria as their main source of water. 
• Water treatment and quality issues in Kisumu and Homa Bay. 
• Regular and sometimes very long power black-outs which interfere with pumping of 
water. 
• Heavy reliance on donor funding. 
• Pro-poor focus is yet to be fully achieved. 
• Legal challenges, i.e. the legal penalty for illegal connections and other tampering of 
the water supply system by residents are not sufficiently punitive. 
6.3  Towards a new research agenda 
This Working Paper has outlined some of the emerging impact and challenges of water 
sector reforms and interventions in Kenya. Whereas the emerging impact and challenges 
are in line with the results of other studies and findings in Kenya118, there is need for a 
detailed research on some of these issues. One area that has so far received little attention 
is the impact of the water sector reforms and interventions on the livelihoods of the urban 
poor households. It has been observed that improved access to safe, reliable and af-
fordable water, especially to the urban poor, can be beneficial in a number of ways, for 
example: 
• It can improve the household’s health and nutritional condition by reducing water-
borne diseases and morbidity. 
• It reduces the amount of time and energy spent on looking for or fetching water, 
which can be used on other productive economic activities. 
• It reduces the high cost of buying water from other sources and the cost incurred in 
treating waterborne diseases, which can otherwise be put to other uses. 
• It increases participation of women in income-generating activities and the girl-
child’s school attendance. 
                                                 
118 See for example Wambua (2004); Ombogo (2006); Otiego (2006); Citizen’s Report Card (2007); 
Kisima (2008) and WASREB (2008). 
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• It can enhance the household’s economic activities that depend on water (i.e. small-
scale businesses, urban farming, etc). 
 
The proposed research project (by the authors) not only aims to provide a detailed 
description and analysis of the nature and extent of water sector reforms and inter-
ventions in urban Kenya, but more importantly, to assess the impact of the reforms and 
interventions on the livelihood of the urban poor households. 
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